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Preface 
 
 My interest in developmental issues, theories and realities arose continuously 
from my political science studies. Furthermore, I focused my attention towards the 
international system and its role in developing countries. Therefore I chose to write 
my diploma thesis on Tanzania and its unique history as an independent country. The 
first books I have read on this subject convinced me, that it was indeed a peaceful, 
however, poor country. To satisfy my curiosity I examined the reasons for its state of 
art. Certainly, the question for the country’s poorness can be easily answered by the 
fact of colonialism, nonetheless deserves an in-depth examination of Tanzanian’s 
recent history of independence. Viewing today’s Tanzanian domestic politics one can 
easily observe its significant influence, made by the international organizations and 
donors. Frankly, the impression that the government is acting more in the interest of 
the financial aid institutions and countries and less in the interest of its own citizens 
is quickly made. These impressions were the starting point for my thesis and 
ultimately my research about the changes of the political culture in Tanzania trough 
the influence and intervention of the international organizations and donors.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter I: 
Introduction 
 
 Presently, Tanzania is one of the poorest countries in the world. In the Human 
Development Index (HDI) it ranks 152nd out of 179 countries with 0,503 points.1 Its 
political history as an independent country started in 1961 (Mainland, Zanzibar in 
1963) with the implementation of the African Socialism by President Julius K. 
Nyerere. During the 1980s the liberalisation process led to a significant change, 
namely to a multi-party democracy in 1992. From 1995 elections were held in 5-
year-cycles. Even to this day in Tanzania, one can still trace the overwhelming 
support for the former single party leader, Chama Cha Mapinduzi2 (CCM). Since the 
1990s many International Organizations and donors participated in Tanzania’s 
development via different means, for instance, with financial aids, technical 
assistance, advice etc. My objective for this diploma thesis is the assessment of the 
government’s decision-making process. I assume that this process is dominated by 
the interests of the International Organizations, i.e. the World Bank (WB), 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and United Nations (UN) and donors. 
Furthermore, I suppose that the growing influence of the aid giving organizations and 
countries is continuously changing the citizen’s attitudes and values towards the 
politics. 
 
 
Historical Background 
 
From 1884 to 1918 Tanganyika was a German colony and more specifically a part of 
the German-East-African region. From 1890 onwards, the islands of Zanzibar 
became a British protectorate. At the end of the First World War Tanganyika became 
a British trusteeship territory.3 On December 9th 1961 Tanganyika reached the 
independence from Great Britain and was proclaimed a sovereign Republic, one year 
later. The Prime Minister Julius K. Nyerere was elected as the first President of 
                                                 
1
 HDR 2008: http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/2008/countries/country_fact_sheets/cty_fs_TZA.html     
13.8.2009 
2
 Revolution Party 
3
 Fischer Weltalmanach 2006: p. 446 
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Tanganyika. Zanzibar became independent on December 10th 1963, and after a short 
revolution the islands were declared a Republic on January 12th 1964. The Union of 
these two states was proclaimed on April 26th 1964, where the new name Tanzania 
emerged.4 The Tanganyika African National Union Party (TANU) was proclaimed as 
the only legal party in 1965.5 President Nyerere established a new political system 
according to his ideology of the “African Socialism”.  
 
„Socialism–like democracy–is an attitude of mind. In a socialist 
society it is the socialist attitude of mind, and not the rigid adherence 
to a standard political pattern, which is needed to ensure that the 
people care for each other's welfare. “6  
 
The first decisions made by the new government had the priority to create peace and 
unity among the citizens. When the collective experience of colonialism and the 
fighting for independence was still alive, few measures were needed to create a 
nation. In this context it was mainly the implementation of the Swahili as the national 
language which united the people from the mainland and the islands together, hence, 
creating a national identity. This way peace was ensured and the borders between the 
tribes, the cultures and religions were crossed. However as an ideology, the system 
failed to build up a stable and sustainable economy and thus failing to reduce 
poverty. With the upcoming wave of globalization and the ideological victory of 
capitalism over socialism in 1989, the urgent need for a change of the political 
system at its core emerged. Coupled with an input that came from the IMF and WB, 
the multi-party system was proclaimed in 1992. Since then, Tanzania remained a 
peaceful, however poor country.  
 
 
Statement of Problem 
 
The International Financial Institutions (IFIs), i.e. mainly the IMF, WB and Africa 
Development Bank (ADB) play a major role in the ongoing development matters of 
African countries. In order to receive grants and loans the countries are bound to 
                                                 
4
 http://www.tanzania.go.tz/profile1f.html  12.6.2007 
5
 Clark (1978): p. 28 
6
 Nyerere (1968): p.1 
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certain conditionalities. Since the early 1990s one of these conditionalities is known 
under the term of “Good Governance”. Since its founding, this expression is lacking 
a clear definition; however there is a concensus that it includes political conditions 
like transparency, accountability, rule of law, protection of human rights etc. In 
Tanzania these new conditionalities were given by the IFIs in a period of political 
transitions and were accepted as one of the new goals to achieve. In my study I want 
to focus on the aforementioned conditionalities which are bounded to the keyword 
“Good Governance” and their impact on the political culture of the country, as such. 
 
Objectives of the Study 
 
My aim is to define the extent and range of the term “Good Governance”, its 
ideological meaning and ability to be a tool of pressure in the hands of the IFIs and 
donors. Furthermore, I want to focus on its intervening power to alter the political 
culture, and thus creating dependence not only on foreign aid but also in ideological 
terms and real politics. To examine these dynamics, I will seek to observe the power 
relations within the decision-making process of current Tanzanian politics. 
Besides of my aim to seek a definition for the term “Good Governance”, as it 
is my understanding that it is a synonym for the current international developmental 
politics, including strategies and objectives. In this context it is crucial, to point out 
that this term and its meaning (ideological and in real politics) was introduced by 
foreign organizations and did not occur in the places of its later implementation. 
 In my thesis, I assume that the decision-making process in Tanzania is 
determined by these conditionalities suggested by the IFIs and donors and does not 
respond to the citizen’s needs in wider context. Since the introduction of the multi-
party system and the involvement of the IFIs and donors in the domestic politics of 
Tanzania the relationship between the government and the inhabitants is 
deteriorating. The delivery of social services did not improve through the new 
approach of capitalist politics. All in all Tanzania remains in strong dependency on 
foreign aid without outstanding improvements in economy and poverty reduction.  
 
Research Methodology 
 
My research is based on a literature analysis, combined with interviews I 
made on my visit in Tanzania in 2008. The literatures I studied are official 
government publications and the International Organization’s studies on the one 
hand and scientific literature on the other. Concerning the scientific literature I have 
focused on current domestic researchers. Most of the literatures quoted in this thesis 
are available in libraries located in Dar es Salaam. The interviews were held in Dar 
es Salaam and Arusha; the interview partners were experts in the fields of the United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Hakikazi, HakiElimu and Research on 
Poverty Alleviation (REPOA). The third source I will be useing is based on my own 
personal experiences during my stay in Tanzania. The information I obtained is 
based on my observations and conversations with citizens, whom I consider as 
experts since they are the one who are affected the most by the given circumstances. 
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Chapter II: 
 
The Ideology of African Socialism and Tanzania’s Political 
Culture 
 
Political Culture: 
 
 In this section I will first of all introduce and define the terms of “Political 
Culture” and “African Socialism”. In the second part, I will discuss the political 
culture of Tanzania along with its political history, as well as internal and external 
influences of world politics, economy and globalization.     
 
 
The phrase “Political Culture” was introduced into the social sciences by Almond 
and Verba in 1963. In their book “The Civic Culture”, they studied the political 
attitudes in five democratic (western) nations. Their definition of this term remained 
a standard among the scientific community, to this day.  
Almond and Verba identified political culture as “(...) the particular distribution of 
patterns of orientation toward political objects among the members of the nation.”7 In 
other words, political culture is a set of values, attitudes and orientations of the 
citizens towards the political system as a whole and its parts in particular. 
Furthermore, they stated that the political culture can, however, must not harmonize 
with the political system. In their study they identified three types of political 
cultures, namely, the parochial, subject and participant culture. The differences 
between these types rest on the citizen’s knowledge and feelings about the particular 
political system and their degree of participation in it. The different types of political 
cultures do not replace each other but are mostly combined. The ideal type of a 
political culture would be what they name the civic culture.  
 
“(…) the civic culture is a participant political culture in which the 
political culture and political structure are congruent. (…) 
                                                 
7
 Almond/Verba (1963): p 14f 
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Individuals become participants in the political process, but do not 
give up their orientations as subjects nor as parochials.”8 
 
Political cultures are imperative for the functioning of political systems. Therefore 
political outputs should reflect the inputs from the members of society. Furthermore, 
Almond and Verba identified the relationship between the political culture and the 
political structure as “(…) one of the most significant researchable aspects of the 
problem of political stability and change.”9  
 
Generally speaking, in the context of Third World countries and specifically in the 
case of Tanzania authors also refer to Almond and Verba’s classification. 
 
“The developing nations are of parochial culture (…) while 
structures are participant. (…) Tanzania is more subject-participant 
than parochial-participant.”10 
 
While Okema refers to Almond and Verba he claims that their classification is 
useful, however, does not explain the complexity of cultures (social and political) in 
developing countries.  
 
In my thesis, I will not classify the political culture of Tanzania in the 
aforementioned categories that Almond and Verba devised. It is my understanding 
that these classifications are not useful in the context of developing countries and in 
the present political global structure. Furthermore, I will refer to a definition of 
political culture, as the relationship between the citizens and the state. Moreover, the 
values, knowledge and orientations of the citizens towards the political system and 
its parts. On the other hand also the orientations of the decision-makers and the 
political outputs.   
  
 
 
                                                 
8
 Almond/Verba (1963): p 31f 
9
 Almond/Verba (1963): p 34 
10
 Okema (1996): p 3f 
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African Socialism: 
 
In this part I will define the ideology and implementation of “African 
Socialism”, in regards of the initial meaning formulated by Julius Nyerere and its 
meaning among scientists. As a next step, I will describe Tanzania’s political culture 
from a historical retrospective.      
 
In 1962 Julius Nyerere published an article called: “Ujamaa – The Basis of 
African Socialism”, where he essentially explains the fundamental ideas behind his 
ideology.  
For Julius Nyerere the main difference between the European and the African 
socialism is that the former emerged as a counter strategy against capitalism. It was a 
reaction on the ongoing exploitation by the class society. Nyerere claims that before 
colonialism there was no known class system within the traditional African society, 
hence no exploitation occurred. The concepts of salaried employees and  land 
property were brought to Tanzania through the Europeans, i.e. as a part of 
colonialism.  
Nyerere advocated that society should return to the more traditional values and 
social orders, which were a part of their culture beforehand. In this case, all people 
would work together for the greater good. According to his philosophy, all revenues 
are shared and society is perceived as a type of family, in the widest sense. This is 
the basic essence of Nyerere’s ideology and the meaning behind the word “Ujamaa” 
(which can be translated as “Familyhood”11), that is a term that is often used 
synonymously to the policy of African Socialism. Hence, it is necessary to separate 
Nyerere’s ideology and its implementation from the European concept of Socialism 
and its underlying theory of Marxism.  
Point was also made by Hydén, when he characterized Marxism. In 
Accordance to Hydén, the emerging struggles for a socialist revolution in Western 
Europe are rooted in the previous technological achievements made by capitalism. 
Moreover he claims that a socialist revolution in the African context cannot be 
compared with the one in Europe. Owing to the fact that in predominant cases the 
                                                 
11
 „Modern African socialism can draw from its traditional heritage the recognition of ‚society‘ as an 
extension of the basic family unit.“ Nyerere (1968): p 12 
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means of production are not controlled by the ruling class but are in the hands of the 
producers themselves.12 Nyerere’s aim was to transform society back and evoke the 
former values and structures in order to begin a development.  
 
“The environments are reflected in the state in the form of 
responces. The state may respond by adopting problems of the 
society as its own. This was the cause with the desire for 
development. It can take the problems, reinterpret them and come 
out with policies that suit its interests but in a language understood 
by the society. This was the case with ujamaa and the application 
of Kiswahili language.”13 
 
The conditions for this transformation profited from the struggle for independence. 
As a matter of fact, it proved to be a uniting feature of all citizens. The importance of 
unity was clear to all people; for Nyerere this situation created the perfect ground to 
implement his ideology. Under Nyerere’s leadership the Tanganyika African 
National Union Party (TANU) led the country into independence and henceforth 
found a large support among Tanzania’s citizens, especially the peasantry, which 
makes out the largest group among the citizens.14  
 
The first development strategy was conceived by the government in 1961. It was a 
Five Year Plan where the main emphasis was set on the industrial sector through 
which modernization should take place. In this period, Tanzania received a great deal 
of external financial assistance. Hence the development strategy was additionally 
influenced by external voices, in particular the WB.15 This policy of modernization 
found little acceptance amid the peasants. This was also reflected in their low degree 
of participation among the peasants. The main beneficiaries of the subsequent 
economical growth and improvements in social services were the middle classes in 
urban areas, a fact which further widened the income gap between the middle class 
                                                 
12
 Hydén (1982): 244ff 
13
 Okema (1996): p 11 
14
 Many authors declare the party’s character at that time as a “national movement“.  For ex. Pratt 
(1976), Dashwood (2000), Havnevik (1993)  et.al. 
15
 Jennings (2003): p 164f; Pratt (1976): p 166 
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and the peasants. According to Pratt this led to class stratification by the end of this 
period, i.e. by 1967.16  
 
Concerning rural development, the government introduced in 1962 a new 
policy under the key word of “self-help”. The planning of this development policy 
involved the rural population and thus represented “(…) a new take on an old 
practice, a combination of tradition and innovation.”17 The Village Development 
Committees (VDCs) were established in 1962, and they ought to be the authority 
channels for the creation of development plans at all levels, i.e. the village, district 
and regional level. Additionally, the plans had to fit into the national development 
plan in order to get the official’s support. Within this development strategy, projects 
would be targeted, initiated and implemented by the communities themselves with 
the help from the officials in form of fundings. Though the projects were targeted, 
they were never fully realized according to the official’s plans. As Hydén claims, the 
aim of the installation of the VDCs was to create a relationship between the peasants 
and the government where the former would be dependent on the latter. Hence the 
peasants would also be vulnerable to their policies.18 Hydén further refers to the 
peasants influence on politics during the colonial rule. According to Hydén, it was 
based on active resistance and participation. After independence in 1961 their power 
was centered on their influence on the political process itself, while the government 
did not force them into active participation. Therefore, it was in their own power to 
determine the issues and directions of the government policies, via frustrating the 
implementation or trough patron-client relations.19  
Due to a reorganization of administrative responsibilities for the rural areas and their 
lacks of funding the self-help development strategy formally collapsed in 1965/66. 
However, in Tanzanian’s reality it remained visible among the peasant’s behavior; 
since there were schemes initiated outside the official channels and brought to them 
after completion.20  
 
"The Tanzanian state had mobilised the populace in a massive 
outpouring of self-help, raised expectations of what could be 
                                                 
16
 Pratt (1976): p 230; p 221 
17
 Jennings (2003): p 165 
18
 Hydén (1982): p 86ff 
19
 Hydén (1982): p 91 
20
 Jennings (2003): p 170 
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expected as the fruits of independence, and yet held scarce 
resources with which to develop the nation."21  
 
According to Jennings, the approach of the self-help development strategy and its 
realization shaped the relationship between the peasants and the government.22 
However, the policy of self-help changed by 1969, when the VDCs were transformed 
into Ward Development Committees, which had a greater executive power. Their 
targets were planned at the central state level. Hence, the control over development 
was shifted away from the people and their active participation to the central 
government. After these changes were established, the peasants were expected to 
implement the development schemes, even upon compulsion. In this context 
Jennings claims that by 1969 the former policy of self-help had developed into 
statism.23    
 
“(…) Nyerere and his government moved sharply to establish 
complete domination over the development process, and in the 
event undetermined the concepts of popular participation that lay 
at the heart of the rhetoric surrounding Ujamaa.”24 
 
With the collapse of the self-help policy a new period began, which was introduced 
with the articulation of the “Arusha Declaration”. This document was not only the 
first official constitution of the single party TANU, it also expressed a new approach 
of development politics in Tanzania. There were several previous events which had 
influenced the declaration and the following policies. It was recognized that the 
country was too dependent on foreign aid and hence fragile to external crisis in the 
aid giving countries. Furthermore, Nyerere acknowledged the need for a foreign 
policy of non-alignment and a recommitment to democracy and socialism.25  
 
                                                 
21
 Jennings (2003): p 175 
22
 Jennings (2003): p 165f 
23
 Jennings (2003): p 175ff 
24
 Jennings (2003): p 186 
25
 Pratt (1976): p 171 
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“(…) Tanzanians had come to recognize that an overreliance upon 
foreign aid exposes a country to donor pressures which can 
seriously undermine its capacity for independent action.”26  
 
The attitudes and values of leaders on different levels that came up until 1966, forced 
Nyerere to the decision of clear rules, in order to avoid capitalist behavior, corruption 
that could possibly endanger the party and its relationship to the people, as a whole.27 
Overall it was is clear that Tanzania’s experiences with domestic development 
policies and external financial assistance on its several levels (i.e. aids, technical 
advice, political advice etc.) within the first five years after their independence did 
not lead to the expected results and hence required rearticulating.  
 
The Arusha Declaration was pronounced in 1967, introducing several changes in 
domestic policies, developmental strategies and a recommitment to democracy and 
socialism, in addition to its values and attitudes favoured by the country.  
The TANU party was proclaimed as a socialist party with the basic principles built 
on human rights, and citizen participation on every level – the “(…) country shall be 
governed by a democratic socialist government of the people.”28. The TANU 
constitution is also the first document that expresses the principles of their socialism.  
 
“(…) to ensure economic justice the State must have effective 
control over the principal means of production; and (…) it is the 
responsibility of the State to intervene actively in the economic life 
of the Nation so as to ensure well-being of all citizens and so as to 
prevent the exploitation [at all levels] (…), and so to prevent the 
accumulation of wealth to an extent which is inconsistent with the 
existence of a classless society.”29 
 
The party is of the opinion, that the Tanzanian society is classless because of 
the fact that all people are workers and peasants. Those are the ones, who elect the 
single party to power, in order, to ensure democracy. The policy of self-reliance is 
                                                 
26
 Pratt (1976): p 232 
27
 Pratt (1976): p 232f 
28
 The Arusha Declaration (1967): p 2 
29
 The Arusha Delaration (1967): p 1 
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one of the major ideological pillows of the party’s constitution. It is built upon the 
key factors of development, which are now considered to be the people, good 
policies, land and good leadership. In the first years of independence this was 
considered to be money, but after the experience with foreign aids they were 
recognized as a threat of independence. Another lesson that was learned after the first 
years of independence was the overemphasis on industry. The main idea was that 
development would enable industry; however it is not its cause. Since there is a lack 
in finance and know-how, they shall not be among the countries priorities. The 
consequence is a spending of budget in the rural areas (i.e. agriculture) and from 
loans the industries in urban areas are build up. The industrial products shall replace 
some of the imports; the agricultural production needs to be exported to get foreign 
currency which is necessary to repay the loans. Combined with the right of the 
government to intervene into the economy, this ideological background is a 
justification for the establishment of the “Ujamaa villages”. Hence, the new 
development strategy which was introduced by the Arusha Declaration was based on  
changes in the production technique in rural areas. For instance, the peasants’ mode 
of production, which is the fundamental basis of Tanzania’s economy. This 
adjustment was expected to cause an all encompassing transformation of society.30  
 
The regulation of economy and production by the government strongly reminds us of  
the economical policies implemented by the USSR. An important difference is, that 
the policy of the Soviet Union was a result of a revolution, thus the control over the 
economy had a different purpose. In Tanzania the aim was to prevent further 
exploitation and dependence, however in the USSR the goal was to become a 
powerful opposite against the capitalist states in economical and ideological terms.   
Over all the Arusha Declaration was a mile stone in the political history of the 
Tanzanian State. On the national and international level the keyword describing the 
new policies and developmental strategies from now on became “Ujamaa”. Among 
social sciences, there seems to be, from past to present, no doubt that this 
aforementioned policy is the key element of socialism in Tanzania. For example, 
Boesen points out in his writing:   
                                                 
30
 Hydén (1982): p 33f 
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“(…) and ujamaa is now almost exclusively understood to mean 
the contemporary Tanzanian socialist ideology and policies, 
with a strong emphasis on state-controlled or collective 
production.“31  
The word itself with the original meaning of “Familyhood” was expanded by 
Julius Nyerere and from now on has a political meaning, additionally to it. The 
policies designed under the umbrella of “Ujamaa”, are aimed to encourage peasants 
to a new form of production since agriculture was recognized to be the basis of 
Tanzania’s economy. The developmental strategy foresaw an increase in the 
agricultural output, hence higher exports. Moreover, Nyerere believed that these 
policies will reduce the developing inequalities within the different sectors of 
society.32 
The proclamation of the Declaration was followed by the implementation of several 
Acts which aim was to realize the goals designed before33: 
• Industrial (Acquisition) Act of 15.2.1967   
• National Bank of Commerce Act of 14.2.1967   
• State Trading Corporation Act of 14.2.1967 
• National Agricultural Products Board Act of 15.2.1967 
• National Insurance Corporation Act of 15.2.1967   
• National Milling Corporation Act in 1968   
• Tanzania Sisal Corporation Act of 27.10.1967  
 
Trough these Acts, the government took over most of the industry and agriculture. 
To protect the economy from foreign investments the government nationalized all 
private banks, acquired complete control over the insurance sector and nationalized 
about half of the sisal estates. The National Milling Corporation was created to buy 
                                                 
31
 Boesen et al. (1977): p 11 
32
 Boesen et al. (1977): p 12 
33
 Clark (1978): p. 45f. 
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the peasant’s products and in times of overproduction make them available for 
exports.  
Furthermore, the state should control the economy to ensure fairness and avoid the 
enrichment of property which would essentially endanger the classless society.  
 
“The five-year period from 1968 to 1973 marked the first stage of 
the policy of ujamaa vijijini, when the mobilization of the peasants 
to establish communal economic ventures in the rural areas 
received top priority by the Tanzanian government and the single 
party, TANU. In 1973 the emphasis shifted towards compulsory 
mass villagization and resettlement of the country’s entire rural 
population, while ujamaa was only supposed to develop later in the 
new villages.“34 
 
As the authors state, the implementation of the “Ujamaa” policy came along 
with some violations on human rights. With this policy Julius Nyerere wanted to 
deepen the citizen’s attitude of mind towards socialism. This was also the aim of the 
Acts (stated above) which would step by step, politicise the whole society. In 1973, 
there were officially 5 556 Ujamaa Villages with about 2 million inhabitants (around 
15% out of the population) with a variety of conditions.35 As a consequence, from 
the the villagers resettlements was the construction of new communities. As a result, 
the communal production was not realizable.  
As Havnevik explains, the policies of the Arusha Declaration were supported by the 
people only for a short period of time and later failed to mobilize the people for 
further participation.36 
Hence the whole concept of the Ujamaa villages and their expected success and 
contribution to the realization of the African Socialism ideology can be estimated as 
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a utopia. Like Boesen writes, the concept had to fail because it missed to formulate a 
realistic strategy.37  
 
„One of the weaknesses of the ujamaa ideology (…) is its 
underestimation of the need for a through analysis of class structure 
and class formation as the basis for a socialist rural development 
strategy in post-colonial Tanzania. Any policy acts upon and is 
reacted upon by the developing class-relations in the country and 
consequently its fate is to a large extent determined by how it-
consciously or unconsciously-relates to different class forces.“38  
 
The main pillow of Ujamaa, i.e. the change of the peasant mode of production to 
communal farming faced in practice many problems. The poor peasants were not 
able to contribute on shared farms, because of their priority of self-subsistence. 
Hence, only those who were better-off could spread their labour, meaning working 
on both fields and being able to sell their products to the National Milling Company. 
Subsequently the opposite effect happened and the government’s expectations 
remained unrealized. As a result, the income gap between ordinary and better-off 
farmers widened.39 After the first five years of Ujamaa, there were no significant 
increases in production and productivity, hence, the government had to rethink its 
strategy. In order to encourage peasants to produce more, international aid cycles 
recommended elevating the producer’s prizes. The measures taken by the 
government of Tanzania were including this recommendations along with 
improvements in infrastructure and social services, in addition to welfare after 1973. 
These offers had limited impact upon the peasant’s mode of production.40 
 
“It would be wrong, however, to create the impression that peasants 
did not try to apply ujamaa in their villages. It was not laziness as 
much as a different set of priorities and limited capacity that explain 
ujamaa shortfalls in rural areas. The peasants did not have a 
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capitalist orientation and were thus unconcerned with the need for a 
surplus as an end in itself.” 41 
 
Despite significant success of the Ujamaa policies, the revolutionary character of 
this development remains unquestioned within the scientific community, for its 
main aim it was to transform society.42  
 
Nyerere saw that neither the parliament nor the local governments are 
significant tools of policy-making, policy-review or public accountability. Thus, he 
changed his strategies which later on had significant impacts on Tanzania’s policy. 
The differences of incomes between leaders and ordinary citizens were lowered, and 
TANU was restructured into a democratic organization, where elections for major 
positions at all levels were held.43  
When the government acknowledged the slow process of implementation of the 
Ujamaa policy among its the population, it decided to use coercive powers to create 
the villages and increase production. In 1972, the decentralization reform was 
introduced to increase the party and government’s power over the peasants and lower 
the autonomous character of the local authorities and district councils.44  The power 
over the development process has been shifted to the central control, dismantling 
local governments and co-operations in the expectation that peasants would address 
the government’s authorities, i.e. bureaucracies at the local levels. Hence, the reform 
also aimed to increase the interaction between the people and the decision-makers.45 
 
„In Tanzania the major result, after nationalizations and 
establishment of a large number of government and parastatal 
institutions, was the near-elimination of the national bourgeoisie 
and establishment of a new working relationship between the 
emerging economic bureaucracy and international capitalism.“46 
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            In the years 1973 and 1974 the international oil crisis affected Tanzania’s 
economy, leading to less production and hence, a higher need for imported food. At 
the same time the government started to resettle major parts of the rural population, 
a measure that led to mass villagization. In the leader's eyes the villagization 
strategy was successful, as the number of people in registered villages rose from 
1,890 in 1972 to 13 million in 1977. According to Havnevik, “[a]bout 70 per cent of 
the rural population had been resettled in the course of about three years.”47 
Moreover, in 1974 the government initiated two countrywide campaigns. The first 
campaign should stimulate more food production. The second was named 
“Operation Vijiji”. Its aim was to encourage rapid raise of production and the 
improvement of the regional crop production by effective resettlements. 
Additionally, til 1977 were all peasants should live and work in registered villages.48 
Along with these policies came new producer price policies in 1973, whose aim was 
to increase the production of food crops, as well as, the national food sufficiency. 
The state fixed prices annually to shift the financial surplus from the peasants to the 
government.49 All these policies of this period meant a dropping of the previous 
Ujamaa concept which on its core had the voluntary participation and gave the state 
an authoritarian character.  
In 1976, the government extended its power to food production by banning all 
private co-operations and replacing them with government crop authorities with the 
sole responsibility for purchasing, processing and sales of food crops. In contrast to 
all expectations, these measures led to agricultural stagnation and an increase of 
parastatals. 50 It becomes obvious, that these policies further undermined the civil 
society and popular participation. 
 
In this time period, the dependence on foreign aid became palpable. 
Tanzania’s foreign policy had to orient its internal needs towards the international 
interests.  
As Wangwe explains  
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“[t]he willingness of donors to extend substantial amounts of aid to 
Tanzania can be explained from two perspectives. First, Tanzania's 
development policies during that time were fairly congruent with 
the dominant views of the social democrats in the North. Second, 
Tanzania was considered to be strategically important in terms of 
foreign policy considerations.”51 
 
After the oil price rose in late 1970s the foreign aid coming to the country was 
trimmed down.52  
 
“The rapid increase in foreign assistance to Tanzania during the 
1970s (…) had the effect of compensating for the underlying 
tendency of economic stagnation and strengthened authoritarian 
statism, which became the dominant trend from around 1973. The 
priorities of external aid coincided with those of the Tanzanian 
state, i.e. the expansion of industry and state institutions as well as 
the maintenance of the social profile of the development model. 
Thus the expectations of both the bureaucratic class and the social 
forces, which had supported the nationalist movement, could 
continue to be met, at least to some extent.”53  
 
During the same time period, Nyerere made significant changes in domestic politics. 
The transformation of TANU into Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM - Revolution Party) 
became official on 5th February 1977. The new party was a union of the TANU and 
the Afro-Shirazi Party of Zanzibar with a recommitment to socialism. The party was 
even more committed to become close to the peasantry and at the same time to 
combat corruption and favourism. The selection of party and political leaders became 
a more regulated process, enabling new elections of leaders, at all levels. These new 
leaders were not having a real mass base among Tanzanians. They were commonly 
higher educated, generally better off and highly committed to Nyerere's demands.54 
The Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania was pronounced in the same 
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year. The existing civil society groups were transformed into organs of the CCM. 
Opposition parties and associations were banned, in practice exiled or jailed.55   
 
“(…) [Nyerere] achieved in fact within the framework of the 
single-party system what would in multi-party systems be called a 
change of regime. His ability to orchestrate this change without any 
serious political disruptions bears witness of the enormous respect 
that Nyerere enjoys in Tanzania.”56 
 
In 1967/68 the external financing amounted to 22% of Tanzania's development 
budget, until 1974/75 this sum rose to 54%. A similar scenario can be observed on 
the dependence of imports, it only shifted from consumer goods to capital goods, 
however, remained strong. Furthermore, the nationalization measures only opened 
the employment market to Tanzanians, however, they did not change the dependence 
on foreign expertise and technology. The 1974/75 fiscal crisis began with difficulties 
to balance budget, production and payments and ended up with the reducing of 
government employees by 20%.57  
 
The economic crisis in 1978/79, was influenced by external events, however in 
Tanzania it had also social and political dimensions. Previously the wages in all 
sectors were eroded and the state authoritarianism increased. By weakening the 
peasantry, the state subsequently faced growth of unaccounted expenditures in 
government and parastatals. According to Havnevik “[t]hese trends gave rise to an 
increasing loss of political legitimacy on the part of the state and the party.”58 
 
The debt crisis caused negative growth rates in the industrial and agricultural sector 
and at the same time was marked by lower exports and higher imports. Social 
services, such as, education, provision of health and water supplies also suffered 
under the given circumstances. Another sign of the crisis was a growing rate of 
unemployment, especially among the youth. All together, these benchmarks of crisis 
were threatening Tanzania’s political stability. The state's response to these 
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developments resulted in two Acts, namely, the Economic Sabotage Act (No. 9 of 
1983) and the Human Deployment Act (No. 6 of 1983). Giving the authorities 
expanded powers to meet the political threats and at the same time violating the 
rights of the affected parts of population. Hence, the population’s respect for the 
legal system lowered after the implementation of these Acts. The state used those 
even against its own bureaucratic class. Overall, it can be argued that the 
aforementioned Acts decreased political legitimacy.59 
 
The international aid crisis in the years 1978/79, made the IFIs and donors put focus 
on the repayment of the loans given to the Third World Countries. Further to this, 
they steps were made to evaluate and coordinate the aid within the institutions, and 
therefore ensure security for their loans. These steps resulted in the introduction of 
the “Structural Adjustment Programmes” (SAPs), in the 1980s.60    
 
In the 1980s, the government of Tanzania finally made an agreement with the IMF, 
which introduced the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) – or in Tanzania’s 
case, the “Economic Recovery Programme” (ERP).  The trade liberalisation was part 
of this programme. According to Okema, these changes have led to a new set of 
inequalities amongst society.61 
 
“At the same time this was evidence of the extent to which 
Tanzania's sovereignty had been eroded by the need for aid. 
Subsequently IMF instructions such as retrenchment, privatization, 
abolition of free medical services have all been carried out in spite 
of the mass sufferings they entailed. Thanks to donor power 
opposition parties and figures can say and do more than otherwise 
would have been the case. The point here is that since colonial 
times Tanzania has always been in a state of dependency. The 
extent of this dependency has varied with time. It seems to have 
been deeper than ever in the 1980s and 1990s.”62 
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In the Arusha Declaration from 1967, Nyerere stated that for its future development, 
Tanzania needs to focus on four main aspects, namely, the people, good policies, 
land and good leadership. At this time, good leadership can be seen synonymously to 
good governance.63 According to the Arusha Declaration, the responsibility for good 
leadership/governance remains in the hands of the government. In Tanzania’s case, it 
was first in the hands of Nyerere (1961 - 1985) and then President Mwinyi (1985 - 
1995). Predating, before it became a target for aid policies from the IFI’s and donors.  
 
The democratisation procedure, that occurred predominantly in villages was a top-
down process. This strategy was supposed to lead to more involvement among the 
people in the rural areas into the decision-making process which affected their 
lives.64 The decentralisation in the 1970s was a disaster.65 The central planed 
economic strategy failed miserably and led to an economic crisis in late 1970s and 
early 1980s.66 The nationalization of the economy, furthermore, led to increased 
corruption at the levels among the elites.67 The next strategy was the initiation of 
Local Governments in the years 1982- 1994, as a result of failing to involve the local 
people in the decentralization strategy. Local authorities were installed after 1982 in 
accordance to the 1977 Constitution. The local authorities were supposed to be free 
and independent from the central governance, however, were in practice controlled 
and determinated in their work by the government officials. Moreover, they were 
required to obtain an approval for their decisions, by the central government.68  
Thus, a change towards opening the markets and liberalisation of politics led to a 
need of a multi-party system and a new understanding of “good governance”.  
 
The IMF was offering aids bound to certain conditionalities, however, did not 
respond to the national programmes. In 1985, President Mwinyi came to power; up 
until 1990 the government started working towards economic liberalisation. “In 
1986, [Mwinyi] signed an agreement with the IMF, liberalised trade and financial 
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regimes, which in effect meant liberalised imports.”69 As a consequence, corruption 
increased. Through the SAPs stringent conditionalities on economics, the fragile 
economies were destroyed, mainly by imported industrialisation and cheap goods. 
The agriculture stagnated and the industrial sector could not develop itself. After the 
end of the Cold War, the IFIs added another condition, namely, the political ideology 
of "democracy", now noticed by multi-party democracy, human rights, “good 
governance” and in conclusion poverty reduction.70  
 
“Among the most important realities of the 1980s and 1990s is the 
growing power of aid donors. In combination with international 
institutions like the World Bank and IMF the donors have been 
able to dictate terms using the threat of withdrawl of aid as a most 
portent weapon. Many African countries instituted multipartism as 
a result. (…) Tanzania policy towards donors changed from the 
adamancy of the Nyerere era to that of avoiding conflict. No effort 
was spared to keep donors pleased. In return donors never 
criticized the Tanzanian Government publicity.”71 
 
 
Until the 1990s the government provided good governance only in terms of gender 
equality and decentralisation.  
 
“(…) there are some bench marks for good governance which were not 
fulfilled to a reasonable extent. For instance, corruption reached the 
hiper extent, there were lack of accountability, transparency and integrity 
in the management of public affairs, there was lack of the rule of law, 
poor protection of human rights and freedom; inefficiency in delivery of 
services to the citizens, lack of participation of citizens in political, 
social and decision making. And above all there was no informed and 
skilled society that could hold its governors accountable because there 
was no freedom of press.”72  
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In 1990 Nyerere stated openly that multi-partism can be up for discussion. In the 
same year President Mwinyi installed the Nyalali Commission to analyze the 
citizens’ views on a shift towards multi-partism. According to their report, 80 per 
cent of the citizens would have preferred the one-party state. During 1990-1995, 
several reforms introduced the multi-party system, which was followed by a rapid 
growth of independent and private press-media.  
 
“This is also the period which witnessed the beginning of the 
donor sponsored workshop or seminar ‘industry’, as well as the 
mushrooming of NGOs and human rights groups. The 
intellectual elite embraced liberal ideology uncritically as it 
joined the IFIs in demonising the state and debunking 
nationalism and socialism.”73 
 
The 1990s marked a period of social, political and economic reforms towards 
liberalization.  
 
“(…) the call for good governance in the 1990s can be seen as a 
coincidental relationship between the external influence of World Bank 
and IMF (…) and the internal crisis and problems of governance existing 
in African countries, Tanzania in particular.”74 
 
President Mkapa laid his focus on the establishment of institutions promoting “good 
governance” and democratisation. Additionally, to economic stability, his main 
efforts were to promote good governance and henceforth meeting the IFI’s and 
donor’s demands. One of these demands focused on combating the country’s 
corruption problem. In 1995, he created a ministry under the President's office, with 
its main responsibility being “good governance”. Furthermore, the Prevention of 
Corruption Bureau was established. One year later, the Wairoba Commission was 
installed to survey a report, including recommendations on the state of corruption, in 
Tanzania. In their report, the Wairoba Commission documented, that the corruption 
has reached pandemic levels in nearly all sectors, public and private institutions. The 
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general poverty in the country contributed to increased corruption. On the other 
hand, corruption emphasised the poverty and worsened the pre-conditions to build 
good governance. Moreover, some citizens have lost all hope in the government and 
the deliverance of services without bribery, hence, corruption became part of an 
enhanced culture.75  
The policy paper “Vision 2025” was published in 2000, describing long-term 
national development targets. In the same year, President Mkapa introduced the 
National Framework on “Good Governance”, to undermine the principles and 
activities of the government. The bureau should prepare a clear definition of "Good 
Governance" and its dimensions. Additionally to this, it should provide 
comprehensive reviews on the activities and progresses made by the government and 
recommend a framework of initiatives.76 
 
With great support of the IFIs, the economy was stabilised and the macro economy 
grew, even when corruption still remained a major problem.  
 
“[President Mkapa] (…) saw the economy through the eyes of the 
IMF or World Bank: society as an object of engineering and 
leadership as a process of admonishing, rather than persuading, the 
people.”77  
 
Among scientists, the policies implemented under President Mkapa earned a lot of 
criticism. For most authors, the Tanzanian state introduced a new dependency on 
itself, letting the external voices dictate the internal conditions.78  
 
The Tanzanian state is supposed to be characterized by the ideology of the CCM – 
meaning it belongs to the workers and peasants, however, it is in the hands of the 
petty bourgeoisie and works on behalf of imperialism. Thus, according to Okema, 
there is need for a new definition of the Tanzanian state, which is in fact belongs to 
the donors more than to the citizens.79 
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“Since capital found in Tanzania is mainly foreign capital the 
“state” is correspondingly alien. It is an extension of metropolitan 
states who have the final say. Sighted as proof is the fact that the 
international finance institutions, donor countries and agencies and 
private foreign investors dictate terms.”80 
 
 
Other obsetvers like Mukandala claim, that Tanzania is in serious need of a new 
political culture. This way Tanzania would be able to reach sustainable human 
development, therefore he argues:  
 
“Human development entails developing human beings in a holistic 
manner and also one that can be sustained from year to year and 
from generation to generation.”81 
 
Later he explains:   
 
“Development of a participatory political and social culture should 
have as its major elements: democratic participation, tolerance of 
diversity and even dissent citizen competence and confidence.”82 
 
Another interesting view comes from Shivji, who is questioning the concept of 
democracy in itself: 
 
“(…) if democracy is about the use and abuse of political (state 
power), it cannot be divorced from the ultimate source of power, 
i.e., property. Democracy at the level of the state is intertwined 
with democracy at the level of civil society. Divorce one from the 
other and you may get the shell but not the substance of 
democracy. Indeed your shell may cover a substance which may 
not be democratic at all.”83 
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The Concept of Good Governance 
  
 
 Since the 1990s until today the term “Good Governance” appeared every so 
often in the context of developing countries and aid, mostly used by the IFIs and 
donors. The term became a synonym for international development policies. 
However, there is no clear and singular definition for this expression.  
 
In the 1980s the conditionalities laid on Third World countries by the IFIs and 
donors were externally oriented and concerned economical issues. This changed after 
the end of the Cold War which meant the ideological victory of democracy over 
socialism and free market economy over central planned economy. After this turning 
point in the world’s history the concept of “Good Governance” was developed and 
became the most important conditionality for an aid relationship. In the first years its 
meaning was almost equal with a call for multi-partism. After the first experiences, 
the conditionality was expanded with further dimensions.  
With the extension of the conditionalities to concrete policy matters, donors risked to 
get involved in the internal politics of the aid-recipient countries. This is a 
responsibility they would not be willing to bear.84 The IFIs and donors came to 
believe that the western model democracy, now propagated through the new 
catchword “Good Governance” is the only way to reach economic growth resulting 
in poverty eradication. 
 
The discourse around the term and concept of “Good Governance” is driven 
along two fronts, namely the scientific community and the IFIs/donors. Even when 
there is interaction between the two discourses, the purposes of them are different. 
As Doornbos points out, the scientific discourse is oriented towards a better 
understanding of state-society relations in their institutional linkages including the 
concerns of different contexts. The donor discourse on the other hand concerns the 
enhancing of policy effectiveness and a conceptual preparation for policy 
intervention. 
For Doorbos the guiding motive behind the donor’s discussions is  
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“(...) the establishment of new global-institutional patterns of 
hegemony, through a ‘disciplining’, in a Foucauldian sense, 
including the governance of ‘self’, of state and policy structures in 
individual countries to conform to the norms set by global 
institutions.”85  
 
Many authors claim that the current discourse about “Good Governance” doesn't 
consider the relationships of power, it is more a moral paradigm between good-bad-
evil and hence it’s theoretical value is weak. Thus it  
 
“(…) has become a flexible tool in the hands of global hegemonies, 
to undermine the sovereignty of African nations and the struggle 
for democracy of the African people. The people are no longer the 
agents of change but, rather the victims of "bad governance", to be 
delivered or redeemed by the erstwhile donor-community.“86 
 
 
The Good Governance agenda is intervention oriented; its aim is to influence 
the countries internal conditions as a preference of the relationship between states 
and international institutions.87 Where the external influences are rising (i.e. 
international markets, globalization etc.) the nation state becomes less powerful and 
hence is providing more of governance than governing the country. Furthermore 
since the governance agenda became the leading path for growth the governments 
are facing a new power constellation where they are sharing the provision of public 
services with lots of new actors (i.e. civil organizations etc.).88 
  
Among the scientific community, there is a lot of criticism about the absence of a 
definition. Many authors point out, that there is not even a common sense about the 
meaning of the term “Governance” itself. Along with this problem, comes the use of 
the term, which appears to be more of a normative than analytical.89 According to 
Pettai and Illing there is a need to redefine the term “Governance” in the first place.  
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“It is perhaps one of the key questions in governance research to 
what extent the state has been a representative of public interests 
and an authoritative decision-maker for problems in the society. At 
the same time, the increasing role or importance of private and 
non-profit actors in ‘governance’ itself presupposes a change in the 
role of the state in deciding the matters of society and fulfilling the 
public interest. It demands special attention to how these new 
directions influence the roles and tasks of public, private and 
nonprofit actors in formulating and implementing public policies 
and public services, and whether the changes brought by 
‘governance’ include in addition to their positive characteristics 
also pitfalls or even threats.”90  
 
 
According to Kabudi, “Good Governance” also limits the state power by separating 
the three main organs – Legislature, Judiciary and the Executive; they must be ruled 
by separate organs of the state.91  
 
“The principle of ‘good governance’ has been advocated in 
particular by international organizations, such as the World Bank. 
The guiding motive behind this development was the establishment 
of state-society relations and market mechanisms in developing 
countries that conform to the standards of Western liberal-capitalist 
systems. By invoking the principle of conditionality, these 
countries should be induced to adopt governance patterns that were 
globally seen as the most effective and efficient.”92 
 
The several interpretations of “Good Governance“ have a number of common key 
factors, namely: democracy, accountability, transparency, rule of law, human rights, 
civil society and political participation. These key factors are considered as 
necessaries for ensuring democracy after the model of Western European countries. 
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The concept is normative and focuses on the organizational and institutional 
structures in the state. According to the IFIs, “Good Governance” is supposed to be 
the only path to sustainable development in terms of economic growth and political 
stability.93  
 
In Tanzania, there are several institutions with the goal to strengthen "Good 
Governance" which were established under Pres. Mkapa. All of them are monitored 
and advised not only by national institutions, but also by the international actors, 
single donor states or organizations.  
Among the critical viewers on these mechanisms is Shivji, who wrote: “(…) we are 
not even sure if "good governance" means the same thing as democratic governance 
of, for and by the people of Tanzania!"94 In this context, he speaks about the need of 
a struggle for a "second independence" - i.e. the people's sovereignty.95 
In his conclusion, Shivji claims that the struggle for an overall independence remains 
incomplete. 
 
“Democratic reforms (…) [are] the prerogative of the people. It is 
the exercise of their sovereignty and their right to self-
determination. (…) This was, and is, precisely the essence of anti-
imperialist struggles. It follows, therefore, that economic and 
political conditionalities, including those on good governance, are 
an expression of the reassertion of imperial domination, however it 
may be labelled.”96 
 
Another explanation for the influence of donors and IFIs on domestic policies 
of Third World Countries can be offered by the phenomenon of Globalization. This 
term is used by researchers in the First as well as in the Third World; with the 
difference that most of the researches in the Third World just take over the definition 
over as a fact without any meaningful criticism. As Shivji claims, the research of the 
phenomenon of globalization in developing countries is supposed to be done by 
researchers coming from that context, rather than taken over.97   
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“Globalisation gives the triad of highly undemocratic world 
financial institutions, the WB/IMF/WTO unprecedented powers, 
reminiscent of the conquering and plundering states of the early 
centuries.”98 
 
The same can be considered about the term “civil society” which was 
developed in the context of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the struggle of 
Eastern European countries for independence on one hand and the US on the other. 
Applied on Africa, it is necessary to speak about a state-civil society. The term does 
not respond to the traditional societies. Thus, “civil society” and “globalisation” are 
both realities put on Africa from above.99 Those terms have become very popular in 
recent years and get very well along with the conditionality and context of “Good 
Governance”. 
 
“The underlying assumption - albeit largely un-stated - was that 
African societies had no effective 'civil society' outside trade 
unions, cooperatives and other such organisations. The governance 
agenda, like the colonial definition of 'civilisation' half a century 
earlier, was in essence an attempt to transport Western traditions in 
Africa. Few efforts were made to base the new organisational 
capacity of African communities on more traditional forms of 
organisation and community effort.”100 
 
The IMF and WB started the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative in 
1999 with the purpose to link debt relief and poverty reduction. The initiative asked 
the aid receiving countries to formulate Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) 
to receive debt relief. In the initiative paper which was formulated by staff of the WB 
and IFM “Good Governance” is recognized as a requirement for sustained economic 
growth, mainly to avoid corruption in economics.101 Although it points out the 
importance of establishing good governance, it provides no clear definition 
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whatsoever and does not formulate the key factors or even strategies for this politics. 
This can be seen also in the following point, stated as a key element of an enhanced 
framework for poverty reduction: 
  
“Broad-based participation is essential to sustained implementation 
of an anti-poverty strategy. In addition to the policy transparency 
that can result from participation, other dimensions of good 
governance are key.“102 
 
Tanzania’s first PRSP addresses the monitoring systems for components of good 
governance. It further states that by an UNDP study the country’s governance was 
recognized as weak and poor marked by a lack in transparency and accountability. A 
way to improve the governance named in this document is “(…) donor coordination, 
improved integration of external assistance into the exchequer system, and 
simplification of aid disbursement procedures.”103  
 
In 1992 the United Nations Committee for Development Planning formulated the 
following attributes for Good Governance:  
 
1. ”Territorial and ethno-cultural representation, mechanisms for 
conflict resolution and for peaceful regime change and 
institutional renewal; 
2. Checks on executive power, effective and informed legislatures, 
clear lines of accountability from political leaders down through 
the bureaucracy; 
3. An open political system of law which encourages an active and 
vigilant civil society whose interests are represented within 
accountable government structures and which ensures that public 
offices are based on law and consent; 
4. An impartial system of law, criminal justice and public order 
which upholds fundamental civil and political rights, protects 
personal security and provides a context of consistent, transparent 
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rules for transactions that are necessary to modern economic and 
social development; 
5. A professionally competent, capable and honest public service 
which operates within an accountable, rule governed framework 
and in which the principles of merit and the public interest are 
paramount; 
6. The capacity to undertake sound fiscal planning, expenditure and 
economic management and system of financial accountability and 
evaluation of public-sector activities; 
7. Attention not only to central government institutions and 
processes but also to the attributes and capacities of sub-national 
and local government authorities and to the issues of political 
devolution and administrative decentralisation.”104 
 
Those attributes should be the guidelines for the work of the UN in developing 
countries. In Tanzania this can be seen in several projects run by the UN. The 
monitoring of the long term effects of those is not concerned as much as the 
reporting of current improvements. 
 
 
The World Bank and IMF have several statements concerning the criteria of “Good 
Governance”.  They also developed several instruments to measure the development 
within the key sectors which are important for the implementing of this policy. In the 
following part some of those criteria shall be presented. Later on, the development of 
the key sectors in Tanzania according to the measurements of the Wold Bank will be 
displayed. 
 
"We define governance as the traditions and institutions by which 
authority in a country is exercised for the common good. This 
includes (i) the process by which those in authority are selected, 
monitored and replaced, (ii) the capacity of the government to 
effectively manage its resources and implement sound policies, and 
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(iii) the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that 
govern economic and social interactions among them."105 
 
The Wold Bank’s six dimensions of Governance for Tanzania are106:      
 
1. Voice and accountability 
2. Political stability and lack of violence/terrorism 
3. Government effectiveness 
4. Regulatory quality 
5. Rule of law 
6. Control of corruption 
 
 
The following figures show the development of these indicators within the years 
1996-2007 presented by the World Bank.107 Below the figures are the World Banks 
definitions of those dimensions. 
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Table 1: Voice and Accountability 
108
 
“Voice and accountability measures the extent to which a country’s citizens are able 
to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, 
freedom of association, and a free media.”109 
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According to this figure the possibilities of political participation were significantly 
lower in the election year of 1995 than in 2000 and 2005. The election results of 
these years are presented in the next chapter. Political participation also includes the 
organization and function of the civil society.  
According to the Transparency International Country Study of 2003 Tanzania’s civil 
society remains underdeveloped in terms of human and material resources. Most 
NGOs criticize the government for the NGO Bill which threatens their function as 
watchdogs and independent analysis makers. It also undermines the space for public 
transparency and participation which are crucial for good governance.110 
 
Table 2: Political Stability 
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“Political stability and absence of violence measures the perceptions of the 
likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional 
or violent means, including domestic violence and terrorism.”111 
 
 
 
Table 3: Government Effectiveness 
 
 
“Government effectiveness measures the quality of public services, the quality of 
the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the 
quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the 
government’s commitment to such policies.”112 
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Table 4: Regulatory Quality 
 
 
“Regulatory quality measures the ability of the government to formulate and 
implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector 
development.”113 
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Table 5: Rule of Law  
 
 
“Rule of law measures the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by 
the rules of society, in particular the quality of contract enforcement, the police, and 
the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence.”114 
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Table 6: Control of Corruption 
 
 
“Control of corruption measures the extent to which public power is exercised for 
private gain, including petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as “capture” of 
the state by elites and private interests.”115 
 
The country’s efforts in improving the control over corruption have also been 
positively marked in the studies of Transparency International. Institutional changes 
and the awareness rising among the citizens have also contributed to enhance 
accountability and transparency. The country report of 2003 that the ranking 
improved from 1,9 points in 1998 to 2,7 in 2002.116 The Corruption Perception Index 
measures from 0- highly corrupt to 10- highly clean points. In the last report form 
2008 Tanzania scored 3,0 points.117  
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Chapter III: 
Statistical Facts on Tanzania 
 
 In this chapter, I will present data that I consider helpful in understanding 
Tanzania’s current economic and social situation. I will introduce key statistics 
concerning poverty elevation, Official Development Assistance (ODA) and, 
furthermore, I will include the results of the elections which took place after the 
implementation of a multi-party system in 1992. 
  
The data below are taken from the World Development Indicators database118; the 
selection of certain statistics is done by the author.  
 
− Population, total (2008): 42,48 million 
− Population growth, annual (2008): 2,9% 
− Life expectancy at birth, total (2008): 56 years 
− Fertility rate, total (2007): 5,6 births per woman 
− Mortality rate, under 5-years (2007): 116 (per 1000) 
− Births attended by skilled health staff (2005): 43% of total 
− GDP (2008): US$ 20,49 billions 
− GDP growth, annual (2008): 7,5% 
− Inflation, GDP deflator, annual (2008): 8,9% 
− GNI per capita, PPP (2008): US$ 1,230 
− Official development assistance and official aid (2007): US$ 2,811 million 
− Agriculture per cent of GDP (2005): 46 
− Industry per cent of GDP (2005): 17 
− Services etc. per cent of GDP (2005): 37  
 
Additionally, important indicators applied by international politics, is for 
instance the Human Development Index (HDI). Developed by the agencies of the 
United Nations they serve two functions. Firstly, they show the country’s economic 
and social performance, and secondly they open up the opportunity to compare 
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different countries in respect to one another. This comparison is made on the 
economical level (in terms of numbers) but also in terms of quality of life. 
The HDI, which was developed in 1990 by the UNDP goes beyond the GDP as a 
significant factor of wealth and includes life expectancy, adult literacy and enrolment 
at all school levels and the purchasing power parity (PPP) in a country.119 The index 
goes from 0 to 1; the higher points a country reaches the more prosperous it is. 
Tanzania’s HDI is 0,503 which is rank 152nd out of 179 countries.120 
Moreover, the UNDP developed the Human Poverty Index for developing countries 
(HPI-1) which measures the identical levels as the HDI, however, the focus is set on 
the proportion of people below a threshold level. Hence, the HPI-1 looks beyond 
income deprivation and focuses on multiple dimensions of poverty. In distinction to 
the HDI the HPI-1 measures the proportion of people who are not expected to 
survive the age of 40 years, the adult literacy rate, the proportion of people without 
access to an improved water source and the proportion of underweight children under 
the age of 5 years. The data is presented in per cent, lower number means more 
development. This index represents an alternative to the poverty measure of $1 per 
day.  
In the HPI-1 Tanzania reaches a significant high percentage of 32,9% and ranks 
henceforth 98th among 135 countries, for which the index has been calculated.121 
The following map, originally illustrated in Tanzania’s Poverty and Human 
Development Report of 2002 provides a first good impression of the inter-regional 
disparity in terms of poverty. It is very similar to the nature of maps which display 
disparities in regards to distribution of electricity, access to clean water etc. The 
variations basically persist and the distribution continuous to be comparable to this 
day. 
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122
 
 
In 1995 the UNDP introduced an alternative Index that focuses in capturing 
inequalities between genders, employing the same indicators like the HDI. The 
gender disparity in a country is displayed in contrast between the HDI and the 
Gender-related Development Index (GDI). Tanzania reaches a GDI value of 0,500 
which is almost equal to the country’s HDI value of 0,503. In comparison ranks at 
98th out of 157 countries measured with this index.123    
The final UNDP’s measure that I would like to introduce is the Gender 
Empowerment Measure (GEM) which exposes inequalities in opportunities in 
selected areas of economics and political participation. Tanzania’s GEM value is 
0,600. This means it ranks 48th out of 108 measured countries.124 
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Overall, the different measures and indexes indicate that Tanzania’s 
performance relating gender issues is quite well. However, when it comes to the 
country’s most targeted problems (economic growth, poverty elevation, health care 
etc.) its performance can be concidered rather poor.  
 
The table below presents a number of poverty types among the population 
with a special focus on women’s interests. I especially appreciated the comparison of 
the years 1991/1992 and 2000/2001, as well as the distinction between the areas of 
observation. The table displays the development of poverty over a decade in different 
environments.   
 
 
Table 7 : Poverty Trend in Tanzania: 1991/92 – 2000/01125 
 
Attribute Dar 
91/92 
Dar 
00/01 
Other 
Urban 
91/92 
Other 
Urban 
00/01 
Rural 
91/91 
Rural 
00/01 
Mainland 
91/92 
Mainland 
00/01 
Food Poverty 
(%) 
13.6 7.5 15.0 13.2 23.1 20.4 21.6 18.7 
Basic needs 
poverty (%) 
28.1 17.6 28.7 25.8 40.8 38.7 38.6 35.7 
Female 
Households 
Heads (%) 
14.1 20.9 23.9 27.9 16.7 22.1 17.6 22.9 
(%) Females 
with no 
education 
11.7. 10.6 18.7 17.7 36.0 37.1 32.3 32.5 
(%) Widowed 10.9 16.9 19.1 26.1 37.9 37.9 32.8 34.4 
 
 
“What the comparison of growth and poverty trends reveals is that much 
of the growth between 1991/92 and 2000/01 did not translate into poverty 
reduction. In other words, the growth process was not pro-poor.”126 
 
Not only was the growth process during this aforementioned decade not pro-poor, in 
some of the areas the conditions even worsened. Taking a deeper look at the table it 
becomes clear that the only significant improvements can be witnessed in the city of 
Dar es Salaam. In rural areas the percentages are almost stagnating in the respected 
period. Especially the high percentage of the basic needs poverty as well as females 
without education is a significant sign of insufficient development. Considering the 
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fact that most Tanzanian’s live in rural areas and work in agriculture, these numbers 
show that the implemented policies and programmes were not successful. 
 
 As aforementioned, I will now present the election results from the years 
1995, 2000 and 2005. The aim is to showcase that the former single party CCM is 
still and by far the country’s leading political voice. The implementation of the 
multi-party system which was, as mentioned before, not desired by the population 
did not lead to a diversified political landscape. 
Between the years 1965 and 1992 Tanzania was proclaimed a single-party republic 
with elections held in 5-year cycles. Clearly without opposition the TANU and after 
1977 the CCM party always won the elections for the national assembly and Julius 
Nyerere was re-elected as president until 1985 when he resigned. In the 1985 
presidential elections the only candidate was Ali Hassan Mwinyi, who was re-elected 
in 1990. The attendance of registered voters at the elections in the one-party system 
always reached more than 70%, and during the elections in the years 1975 and 1980 
gained more than 80 per cent.    
The implementation of the multi-party system was a step in meeting the interests of 
the IFIs and donors. However, it could have also been a significant threat to the 
political stability of Tanzania. The following election results proved, that the CCM 
party and its leaders did not have to fear to lose its power to the new formed 
opposition parties.   
In 1995 76.7% of the registered voters attended the Presidential election. Of those 
61,82% voted for Benjamin Mkapa, the CCM candidate and 59,22% voted for CCM 
in the National Assembly elections.  In 2000 the attendance of voters rose to 84,4% 
and Mkapa was re-elected receiving 71,74% of all votes. CCM’s popularity rose and 
the party reached 202 out of 231 elected seats in the National Assembly. In the year 
2005, 72,4% of the registered voters participated at the elections. CCM’s new 
candidate Jakaya Kikwete was elected for president receiving  80,28% of the votes. 
In the same elections CCM received 206 out of 232 seats (70%).127 Observing these 
election results it becomes apparent, that the tradition of CCM and its strength 
among the voters is still sustainable.   
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Ever since of the first appearance of multi-party elections, voices are getting louder 
concerning electoral frauds. These debates, however, appear to be more like 
arguments between the government and opposition than real threats that could 
possibly effect Tanzania’s political stability in the long run.128  
 
 
The development Programs 
 
 To complement the previous chapters and to further provide the reader with a 
broader understanding of the several contents of current international development 
politics the following pages will introduce the most important development programs 
in and for Tanzania. As I have previously mentioned, the most important 
international development agencies are the IFIs and the UN. Hence, the chief 
development programs are originating from these agencies. The differences between 
these programs are based on the actors who formulate them. On the one hand there 
are agendas set up by international institutions and on the other hand there are 
various developed by the government itself. In the following section I will illustrate 
that the targets of the several programs do not differentiate at all. They are firmly 
interrelated not only in their objectives but also in the interests behind them. 
 First of all, I would like to introduce the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) which I consider one of the chief guidelines for development politics today. 
The power of the MDGs results on its underlying Declaration, which was signed by 
all members of the UN, on the other hand the approach which the articulation 
provides is very open and inclusive and hence, applicable in many contexts.    
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The Millennium Development Goals 
 
 
The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) are the result of the Millennium 
Declaration of 2000. It was signed by all the members of the United Nations. The 
main points and targets of the Declaration are formulated as followed: 
 
“The Declaration sets out within a single framework the key 
challenges facing humanity at the threshold of the new millennium, 
outlines a response to these challenges, and establishes concrete 
measures for judging performance through a set of inter-related 
commitments, goals and targets on development, governance, 
peace, security and human rights.”129 
 
In addition to that, all the members agreed that achieving of the MDGs shall be 
reached by actions, which should take the given particular conditions into account 
and not be placed upon unanalyzed circumstances.  
 
“The actions foreseen at global and national levels will be 
connected with one another for coherence and effectiveness but 
will be designed and implemented primarily according to the 
particular needs, opportunities and constraints prevailing at each 
level – in other words, a context specific approach rather than a 
standard or uniform model will be followed.  The objective will be 
to ensure that the MDGs become an integral part of the priorities 
and actions of a broad range of actors globally, regionally and in 
individual countries.”130 
 
Hence, the MDGs are articulated in a broad language and are able to be applied in 
different contexts and communities. With this approach, the MDGs also aim at 
encouraging the affected people to take over responsibility and action to resolve 
their problems.  
The UN’s contribution to reach the goals is defined as followed: 
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“Goal-driven assistance to address directly key constraints to 
progress on the MDGs, guided by the mandates, comparative 
advantage and resources of the UN system at the country level and 
recognising that the achievement of the MDGs is ultimately the 
responsibility of member states.”131 
 
Further it is pointed out, that the local civil society organizations (CSOs) play a 
major role in holding the leaders into account and giving the actions a “bottom-up” 
push. According to the UN these organizations are a pre-condition for the success 
for the strategy.132  
Resolving from that, the achievements of the MDGs are the responsibility of each 
participating government, its civil society, with and through the guidance and 
assistance of the UN agencies and its partners.  
Another important part for the success of the MDGs are the reports that are one of 
the most important instruments in promoting the projects and in keeping the public 
informed. That is why they ought to be written in a straightforward language, 
understandable for the communities and promoting awareness about the programs in 
and outside of the targeted countries.  
 
“(…) used properly, the MDG reports will help focus attention and 
stimulate action in the developed world on aid, trade, debt relief, 
new technology and investment flows.”133 
 
Aside of the reports that will inform about the overall progress, the studies form 
single countries will report about the achievements and relation to other programs 
that are being implemented at the same time. Special attention needs to be drawn on 
the interrelationship of the MDGs and the PRSPs. 
 
“These country level studies will be essential to develop specific, 
credible and monitorable proposals for achieving the MDGs which 
can be addressed through the policy dialogue and country-driven 
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strategy-setting process envisaged through the PRSPs (or other 
similar national plans and strategies).”134 
 
The national campaigns shall be formulated by local actors with the UN as a 
supporting partner. The UN system should be “(…) supporting rather than 
supplanting national leadership and ownership of action (…)”135. Therefore the 
articulation of the priorities relies on the participating countries themselves, similar 
to the PRSPs. The responsibility relies on the governments and it legitimates the role 
of the IFIs and the UN. Furthermore, it also justifies the interest of all participating 
partners, which are inherited in each program. As the UN point out, the combination 
of these tools are efficient.  
 
“(…) the growing significance of the PRSP in many countries, as a 
tool for setting national priorities and strategies for poverty 
reduction, makes it an ideal instrument for integrating the MDGs 
fully within priorities, policies and resource allocation. As a 
consequence, the UN system will have to continue its active 
participation in the PRSP process, with the agreement of 
Governments and in collaboration with the World Bank and 
IMF.”136 
 
The following chart shows the goals and indicators for Tanzania, and their alterations 
between the years 1990 and 2005. The targets for 2015, according to the MDG plan 
are also displayed, as well as additional remarks.  
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Table 8: MDG Status 
  1990 2000 2005 2006/2007 MDG 
Target 
2015 
Remarks 
GOAL 1: ERADICATE EXTREME POVERTY AND HUNGER   
Proportion of people 
living below national 
basic needs poverty line 
(%) 
39 36 - 33.6 19.5 Needs attention 
Proportion of people 
living below national 
poverty line (food 
poverty) 
22 19 - 16.6 11 Needs attention 
Percentage of under-
weight under-five 
children (wasting) 
28.8 29.5 21.9 - 14.4 On track 
GOAL 2: ACHIEVE UNIVERSAL PRIMARY EDUCATION   
Primary net enrolment 
ratios (%)  
54.2 58.7 94.8 97.2 
(2008) 
100 On track 
Primary gross enrolment 
ratio (%)  
  77.7 
(1999) 
112.7 - 100 Achieved 
GOAL 3: PROMOTE GENDER EQUALITY AND EMPOWER 
WOMEN 
  
Ratio of girls to boys in 
primary school (%) 
98 
(1991/
92) 
98 98 101 100 Achieved 
Ratio of girls to boys in 
secondary school (%) 
  45.91 46.64 105 100 Achieved 
Ratio of females to 
males in tertiary 
education (%) 
  33.52 37.12 68.0 100 Needs attention 
Proportion of women 
among members of 
Parliament (%) 
  21 30.4 30.3 50   
GOAL 4: REDUCE CHILD MORTALITY   
Under-five mortality 
rate (per 1,000 live 
births) 
  147 
(1999) 
112 
(2004) 
  64 Needs attention 
   
Infant mortality rates 
(per 1,000 live births) 
115 99 68 
(2004) 
  38 Needs attention 
   
Proportion of children 
vaccinated against 
measles 
  78.2 80 85 90 On track 
   
GOAL 5: IMPROVE MATERNAL HEALTH   
   
Maternal mortality rate 
(per 100,000 live births) 
529 
(1996) 
  578   133 Needs attention 
   
Births attended by 43.9 35.8 46 62 90 Needs attention 
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skilled health personnel 
GOAL 6: COMBAT HIV and AIDS, MALARIA AND OTHER 
DISEASES 
  
   
HIV prevalence rate 5.5 9.4 6.8 5.7 <5.5 On track 
   
Number of malaria 
cases and incidences 
(cases per 100,000) 
  500,000 65,74
53 
27,030 18,062 On track 
   
Number of tuberculosis 
cases and incidences 
(cases per 100,000) 
188   479 164     
   
GOAL 7: ENSURE ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY   
   
Proportion of land area 
covered by forest  
46%   37.5% 36%   Needs attention 
   
Proportion of people 
using solid fuels (wood, 
charcoal, dung) 
90% 90% 94%       
   
Proportion of population 
with sustainable access 
to an improved water 
source (Rural/Urban) 
  42/85 
(2002) 
53/73 
(2003) 
57/83 74/84 Needs attention 
   
Proportion of people 
with access to improved 
sanitation (Rural/Urban) 
  91  
(2002) 
88.9/9
8.5 
    Needs attention 
   
GOAL 8: DEVELOP A GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP FOR 
DEVELOPMENT 
  
   
External resources -
direct budget support 
(USD mill.) 
  1,100   1,067  
(2207/08) 
    
   
Total external debt stock 
(USD mill.) 
  7,482 8,135 5,368     
   
137
 
 
The chart unmistakeably shows that Tanzania is far away from achieving the MDGs. 
Furthermore, it is important to recognize that this chart, among many others, does not 
differentiate between quantitative and qualitative development. This difference can 
be crucial for the understanding of the several challenges that national development 
is facing. 
The most important goal for my study is goal number eight: “Develop a global 
partnership for development.”138 It is the only goal within the MDGs that addresses 
Good Governance, namely in its target 12: 
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“Develop further an open, rule-based, predictable, non-
discriminatory trading and financial system. Includes a commitment 
to good governance, development and poverty reduction – both 
nationally and internationally.”139  
 
Furthermore “Goal 8 addresses the way developed countries can assist developing 
countries to achieve the other seven goals through more development assistance, 
improved access to markets and debt relief.”140  
With this articulation, the UN addresses the industrial countries and encourages them 
to get  involved in the development of the developing countries. Furthermore, it is 
stated that this development assistance should enable the developing countries to 
reach the other seven goals. As all UN papers, goal number eight and its targets 
enable the addressed actors to interpret their commitment to this goal in their own 
terms. 
 
As stated in the MDG Indicator Handbook, there are several pointers for this goal 
and its targets. For my study I picked out the ones that are directly linked to foreign 
aid and hence have to some extent inherited the power for economical intervention – 
Indicators no. 33, 34, 35, 43.  
 
• Net ODA, total and to the least developed countries, as a percentage of 
OECD/DAC donors’ gross national income 
• Proportion of total bilateral, sector-allocable ODA of OECD/DAC donors to 
basic social services (basic education, primary health care, nutrition, safe 
water and sanitation) 
• Proportion of bilateral ODA of OECD/DAC donors that is untied 
• Debt relief committed under HIPC initiative 
 
The following section will present the charts which are taken from in the Indicator 
Handbook. The purpose is to create a more accurate impression of the aid flows 
coming from the developed countries towards the developing world under the UN’s 
initiative. Before that, I would like to introducet the official definition of the Official 
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Development Assistance (ODA), other definitions for terms used in this section are 
presented in the annex.  
 
“Official Development Assistance are grants and loans to developing 
countries and territories on the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development/Development Assistance Committee 
(OECD/DAC) list of aid recipients that are undertaken by the official 
sector with promotion of economic development and welfare as the 
main objective and at concessional financial terms (if a loan, having 
a grant element of at least 25 per cent). Technical cooperation is 
included. Grants, loans and credits for military purposes are 
excluded. Also excluded is aid to more advanced developing and 
transition countries as determined by DAC.”141 
 
Tanzania’s major donors are also known as the General Budget Support Group 
(GBS). The group includes: the African Development Bank (ADB), Canada, 
Denmark, the European Union (EU), Finland, Germany, Ireland, Japan, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the World 
Bank (WB). The following section will provide data about the GBS countries on the 
selected indicators of Goal 8 and Target 12 presented in the MDG report 2007.142  
 
 
Indicator 33143: Net ODA, total and to the least developed countries, as a percentage 
of OECD/DAC donors’ gross national income 
 
Table 9: Net ODA total in percent of OECD/DAC donors’ GNI; Net ODA in million US$ 
Country/ Year 1990 1995 2000 2005 2007 
Canada 0,44% 
2469,88 
0,38% 
2066,67 
0,25% 
1743,60 
0,34% 
3756,34 
0,28% 
3921,92 
Denmark 0,94% 
1171,16 
0,96% 
1622,67 
1,06% 
1664,18 
0,81% 
2108,92 
0,81% 
2563,02 
Finland 0,65% 0,31% 0,31% 0,46% 0,40% 
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846,30 388,32 370,84 901,94 973,48 
Germany 0,42% 
6319,67 
0,31% 
7523,58 
0,27% 
5030,00 
0,36% 
10082,16 
0,37% 
12267,13 
Ireland 0,16% 
57,28 
0,29% 
153,33 
0,29% 
234,00 
0,42% 
718,94 
0,57% 
1189,79 
Japan 0,31% 
9053,78 
0,27% 
14489,27 
0,28% 
13507,96 
0,28% 
13146,58 
0,17% 
7690,69 
Netherlands 0,91% 
2526,07 
0,81% 
3226,08 
0,84% 
3134,78 
0,82% 
5114,69 
0,81% 
6215,30 
Norway  1,17% 
1204,83 
0,86% 
1244,43 
0,76% 
1263,56 
0,94% 
2786,05 
0,95% 
3727,05 
Sweden 0,91% 
2001,99 
0,77% 
1703,96 
0,80% 
1798,95 
0,94% 
3361,68 
0,93% 
4334,08 
Switzerland 0,32% 
749,74 
0,34% 
1083,57 
0,34% 
890,37 
0,44% 
1771,59 
0,37% 
1680,27 
United 
Kingdom 
0,27% 
2630,14 
0,29% 
3202,21 
0,32% 
4501,26 
0,47% 
10771,70 
0,36% 
9920,67 
 
 
 
Table 10: Net ODA to the LDCs in percent of OECD/DAC donors’ GNI; Net ODA to the LDCs 
in million US$ 
Country/ Year 1990 1995 2000 2005 2006 
Canada 0,13% 
740,02 
0,08% 
444,12 
0,05% 
308,11 
0,09% 
1047,82 
0,10% 
1243,52 
Denmark 0,37% 
462,42 
0,30% 
511,20 
0,34% 
537,28 
0,31% 
814,11 
0,31% 
878,37 
Finland 0,24% 
317,48 
0,09% 
106,24 
0,09% 
111,94 
0,13% 
245,37 
0,14% 
296,00 
Germany 0,12% 
1769,38 
0,07% 
1612,46 
0,07% 
1212,22 
0,07% 
1883,53 
0,09% 
2641,71 
Ireland 0,06% 
21,04 
0,12% 
65,69 
0,14% 
114,46 
0,21% 
364,67 
0,28% 
524,45 
Japan 0,06% 0,04% 0,04% 0,05% 0,07% 
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1753,00 2665,21 2158,67 2326,11 3340,14 
Netherlands 0,30% 
834,20 
0,21% 
932,85 
0,21% 
793,65 
0,27% 
1657,51 
0,21% 
1394,65 
Norway  0,52% 
531,80 
0,26% 
502,22 
0,26% 
427,26 
0,35% 
1029,13 
0,34% 
1128,56 
Sweden 0,35% 
775,35 
0,24% 
500,16 
0,24% 
532,01 
0,31% 
1100,63 
0,30% 
1151,65 
Switzerland 0,14% 
325,11 
0,11% 
346,70 
0,10% 
269,79 
0,10% 
404,92 
0,11% 
452,61 
United Kingdom 0,09% 
834,13 
0,07% 
826,54 
0,10% 
1425,77 
0,12% 
2709,18 
0,16% 
3827,23 
 
 
In comparison, the tables above show the net ODA which is provided by the 
OECD/DAC donors in total and the proportion that flows to the LDCs. These 
numbers clearly showcase the commitment from the Scandinavian countries towards 
the provision of aid over the observed time. It becomes even clearer when we 
consider the total ODA sum. Most donors are able to achieve stable numbers for the 
aid to the LDCs. However, in the proportion to the total aid the performance 
displayed is rather poor.     
 
 
Indicator 34144: Proportion of total bilateral, sector-allocable ODA of OECD/DAC 
donors to basic social services (basic education, primary health care, nutrition, safe 
water and sanitation) 
 
Table 11: ODA to basic social services as percentage of sector allocable ODA; ODA to basic 
social services in million US$  
Country/ Year 1996 2001 2006 
Canada 6,29% 
48,08 
22,55% 
111,60 
31,02% 
410,35 
Denmark 12,61% 
140,45 
6,55% 
28,78 
22,94% 
170,20 
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Finland 5,78% 
9,43 
12,50% 
25,67 
10,26% 
40,41 
Germany 7,99% 
440,46 
8,74% 
231,92 
13,54% 
646,71 
Ireland 19,33% 
0,33 
5,91% 
24,43 
21,90% 
174,52 
Japan 2,23% 
310,89 
3,50% 
289,82 
3,98% 
322,32 
Netherlands 13,96% 
195,55 
30,47% 
360,32 
45,42% 
2275,93 
Norway 13,22% 
69,88 
9,26% 
71,48 
21,81% 
371,21 
Sweden 10,28% 
82,30 
10,63% 
65,58 
19,72% 
378,68 
Switzerland 11,46% 
20,69 
20,06% 
83,58 
5,56% 
39,54 
United Kingdom 28,79% 
442,95 
24,10% 
414,47 
35,55% 
1717,88 
 
 
The table above displays that for most of the observed donors the provision of aids to 
basic social services is becoming more important.   
 
Indicator 35145: Proportion of bilateral ODA of OECD/DAC donors that is untied 
 
Table 12: ODA that is untied in percentage and million US$ 
 
Country/Year 1990 1995 2000 2006 
Canada 46,6% 
530,08 
40,8% 
615,15 
24,9% 
232,89 
62,9% 
1111,10 
Denmark N/A 
N/A 
61,3% 
754,31 
80,5% 
655,53 
95,3% 
1231,56 
Finland 31,5% 
143,61 
75,8% 
107,97 
89,5% 
111,84 
86,5% 
360,66 
                                                 
145
 http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/Metadata.aspx?IndicatorId=35 Accessed 31.10.2008 
 64
Germany 61,8% 
2253,43 
60,3% 
2638,43 
93,2% 
1066,12 
93,3% 
5700,82 
Ireland N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
100,0% 
578,10 
Japan 88,9% 
7644,08 
96,3% 
13043,20 
86,4% 
8991,83 
95,6% 
10592,29 
Netherlands 55,5% 
632,76 
78,9% 
1678,91 
95,3% 
2201,78 
100,0% 
10206,28 
Norway 61,3% 
357,53 
77,0% 
540,99 
97,7% 
636,22 
99,8% 
2041,89 
Sweden 87,5% 
968,10 
93,9% 
1118,92 
85,4% 
80,25 
100,0% 
2825,75 
Switzerland 78,5% 
320,55 
91,3% 
508,74 
93,6% 
514,32 
96,3% 
1041,24 
United 
Kingdom 
N/A 
N/A 
86,2% 
613,51 
91,5% 
1528,88 
100,0% 
6311,35 
 
 
This table clearly illustrates that the OECD/DAC donors are concerned with the 
importance of untied aid. Most of the recipient countries are bound to political  and 
economic conditionalities through multilateral agreements with the IFIs.  
 
Indicator 43146: Debt relief committed under HIPC initiative 
The debt relief for Tanzania committed under HIPC initiative was 2658 million US$ 
in February 2008. Furthermore, 1713 million US$ have been relieved under the 
Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI) by February 2008.  
 
Table 13: The debt service as a percentage of exports of goods and services for Tanzania 147: 
Year 1990 1995 2000 2005 2006 
Percentage 31,3 17,2 11,8 5,4 2,0 
(The debt service payments are adjusted to reflect the HIPC debt relief.) 
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In addition to the chapter dealing with the UN and the MDG mechanism, I 
want to introduce another important agency which is operating in the developing 
countries and, hence, is another connection between the UN, the IFIs and the 
governments. The United Nations Development Framework (UNADF) is a central 
actor in the process of planning and coordinating of development. It is concerned 
with the connection of the findings of the above mentioned MDG reports, as well as, 
the findings deriving from other national and international priorities and strategies, 
such as the PRSPs.148 In Tanzania it was initiated in the year 2001 after a new 
articulation of a cooperation between the UN and the Tanzanian government. It was  
 
“(...) designed to achieve greater integration among all UN Funds 
and Programmes and Specialised Agencies. (…) [It is] based on 
analytic work underpinning the development of the Tanzania 
Assistance Strategy (TAS), the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 
(PRSP) and the Common Country Assessment for Zanzibar, the 
UN’s assessment of the development challenges facing Tanzania, 
and on an understanding of the UN’s comparative advantages.”149  
 
 The following agencies and offices of the United Nations are represented in 
Tanzania:   FAO, IFAD, ILO, UNAIDS, UNCDF, UNDP, UNESCO, UNFPA, UN-
HABITAT, UNHCR, UNICEF, UNIDO, UNOPS, UNV, WFP, WHO and UNIC. 
Others are operational agencies and offices in the country, but based elsewhere.150  
The main actor within the UNDAF is the UNDP. Relating to work provided in 
Tanzania the organization establishes in its report that “Good Governance is 
recognized as a precondition for sustained pro-poor economic growth (…)”.151  
 
In 2007 the UN added a further step towards improving efficiency in its work 
in Tanzania – the document of “One UN” was signed. It is part of a reform within the 
UN to reduce transaction costs on the one hand, and to simplify the ongoing 
streamlines of investments in Tanzania.152 Tanzania is one out of eight countries 
                                                 
148
 UNDG (2003): p 8f 
149
 UNDP (2005): p. 2 
150
 UN Communication Group: 10 Facts about the UN in Tanzania  
151
 UN Communication Group: 10 Facts about the UN in Tanzania: p 6 
 
152
 UMOJA – One UN in Tanzania  
 66
worldwide where the pilot program of “One UN” started within the period of 2007 to 
2008. From my understanding, it is yet another agency concerned with roughly the 
same targets. Like so many other agencies it is complicating the mechanisms 
between the vast number of actors within the developing process rather than 
simplifying them.  
 
During my interview with a staff member of the UNDP Tanzania I sought to 
find more information on subject matter of relationship, differences and ultimately 
the meaning of these two programs. My interview partner explained to me that the 
main difference between the UNDAF and One UN was that UNDAF was articulated 
in cooperation with the government of Tanzania and, thus, concerns the strategies 
from both internal and external interests. One UN was found on recommendation 
from the Secretary General and the General Assembly. Its main objective is to 
strengthen the efficiency and transparency of the UN for the governments. The main 
target of this project is to create one budget, one office, one program and finally one 
leader. Even though it was articulated without the governments help it aims to make 
future cooperations with the UN easier.153  
Given the present state of maintaining over 15 different UN agencies, which are 
operating in Tanzania on more or less similar goals, the transparency and legitimacy 
of these agencies are becoming progressively a challenge in itself. As I will 
demonstrate in the following topics, in the eye of the public, including the media, the 
results of the work do not cover up for the promises made. Resulting from a 
significant lack of transparency, these mechanisms of current development politics 
make the relationship between the citizens and the government even more 
complicated. 
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The Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers 
 
In 1996, the World Bank and IMF proposed the Debt Initiative for the Highly 
Indebt Poor Countries (HIPC) as an approach within the official creditors. Its chief 
objective was “to bring down debtor countries’ external debt to sustainable 
levels.”154 In September 1999, an enhanced account of this proposition was released 
to the HIPCs including the relief of debts bound to certain political and economical 
conditionalities. The debt relief was expected to ultimately lead to poverty reduction.  
 
“The expectation was that, in turn for debt relief, beneficiary 
countries would commit themselves to policies that advanced sound 
economic management and poverty reduction. The initiative 
emphasized structural and social policy reforms, particularly in 
delivering basic health care and education services, facilitated where 
needed by additional financing under the HIPC Initiative.”155  
 
The participating countries had to prepare national strategies on poverty reduction, 
namely, the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) in order to benefit of this 
initiative and receive debt relief.    
 
The Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (I-PRSP) of Tanzania was 
framed in 1999 and published by the United Republic of Tanzania (URT) in the same 
year. It states that “[t]he strategy aims at attacking the country’s deep and pervasive 
poverty by raising growth and enhancing the participation of the poor in the 
development process.”156 
In addition to that, the document highlights the state of poverty in Tanzania, 
admitting that the poverty prevalence has stagnated and even worsened during the 
1990s. In 1999 approximately 15 to 18 million, which constitutes half of Tanzania’s 
population, lived below the poverty line of  0,65 US$ per day. Among those, there 
were almost 12,5 million Tanzanians living in abject poverty, spending less than 
0,50US$ a day.157 
                                                 
154
 WB (2001): p. vii 
155
 WB (2001): p. vii 
156
 URT (1999): p 1 
157
 URT (1999): p 1 
 68
For all indicators of poverty there are many variations within the country’s regions, 
as well as, disparities between urban and rural areas. Furthermore, there are 
noticeable differences between the sexes.  
 
Previous to entering the HIPC initiative and the PRSP process, the 
government of Tanzania adopted, a so called, National Poverty Eradication Strategy 
in 1997. Its articulation is in-line with the International Development Goals. In this 
document, the government has identified priority areas for public expenditure. The 
Poverty and Welfare Monitoring Indicators were developed in the year 1999 as a 
foundation for monitoring the impact and implementation of several poverty 
eradication programs. The monitoring is therefore to be considered a guide for the 
following policies and programs for reducing poverty. The Medium-Term 
Expenditure Framework (MTEF) was established to finance the governments’ 
defined priority areas. The implementation ought to be then monitored in the Public 
Expenditure Review (PER).158  
In 1998, the government initiated the Multilateral Debt Relief Fund (MDF). The 
purpose of this fund can be compared to the HIPC Initiative. In the first year the fund 
received 88US$ million form seven contributing countries. The amount was 
employed in paying off depts to the World Bank, IMF and African Development 
Bank. In 1999/2000 the donors gave 81US$ million to the MDF. The progress is 
monitored in quarterly meetings between the government and the donors.   
The government is also developing the Tanzania Assistance Strategy (TAS), to guide 
foreign aid and improve its efficiency. The PRSP process is seen as an essential 
component of TAS. 
The I-PRSP points out the most important components of the PRSP, which shall be 
completed by 2000.   
 
“[It] (…) will not substitute for existing sectoral programs but will 
strengthen the prioritization of actions within and across sectors 
targeting poverty. 
It will: 
• Assemble baseline data on poverty and develop a national poverty              
line. 
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• Set medium-term poverty reduction targets, including monitorable 
indicators of main poverty objectives that can be achieved within 
one to ten years. These indicators will at the minimum cover 
income poverty, and essential human development. 
• Set poverty reduction targets for each of the priority sectors, 
including primary education and health, rural roads, water, and 
extension services in agriculture. 
• Shift budgetary resources to meet specified poverty reduction 
targets.”159 
 
The I-PRSP also monitors the process of articulating the PRSP. It addresses the 
participating actors and the timeline. The participating actors include international 
and national NGOs, church-based organizations and regional networks. Donors are 
given the role of developing partners. 
On the issue of “Governance”, the I-PRSP draws attention to the need for a National 
Anti-Corruption Strategy and Plan, which shall be completed by 2000.  
Considering the above mentioned strategies and initiatives, namely the National 
Poverty Eradication Strategy, MTEF, PER, MDF and TAS which were initiated in 
Tanzania before the introduction of the HIPC Initiative, the PRSP process does not 
appear as a new and better approach for poverty reduction and economical growth. A 
major difference between the PRSP and the previous strategies lies in its initiator, 
which in this case is the WB and the IMF, representing the interest powers in this 
process.  
However, the PRSP is an important and acknowledged development plan, that I 
would like to examine in greater detail, before  introducing the National Strategy for 
Growth and the Reduction of Poverty (NSGRP).  
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Tanzania’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper  
 
Tanzania’s PRSP came to appearance after the goals were set out in the 
interim paper by the government, its development partners and stakeholders. The 
important difference between this strategy paper and the initiatives mentioned above, 
is that it states that “(...) the PRSP encompasses poverty-oriented extra-budgetary 
activities, and various non-financial considerations that have an important bearing on 
poverty reduction.”160  
Overall, it is encouraging to see that the lessons learned from previous 
programs and initiatives are taken into account in the PRSP. This becomes apparent 
in the question of financing, for example. However, the entire articulation of the 
paper makes it obvious, that even though it is supposed to be a national strategy, it is 
written in a language more likely to attract the IFIs and donors and less Tanzania’s 
society. Therefore, it becomes difficult to implement in Tanzania’s society. 
 
In the PRSP, the focus is even less so on objectives, such as, Governance and 
Good Governance. Governance remains a field which can be improved only by 
efficiency and effectiveness, namely through decentralization. Furthermore, all 
improvements related to the topic of governance, like strengthening accountability 
and improved performance of the public sector are linked to actions in the fields of 
anti-corruption and budget coordination.161 The document does not provide any 
definitions on how to make governments transparent in these fields.  More emphasis 
is laid on monitoring the budget spending and advising. It becomes even more 
evident that the government’s main concern related to Good Governance relies in the 
anti-corruption measures.  
 
“The government will also institute a system of “independent” 
monitors within the framework of the Tanzania Assistance Strategy 
to follow up governments commitments to improve governance and 
institutional framework for higher integrity and more transparent 
accountability as well as donor coordination, improved integration of 
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external assistance into the exchequer system, and simplification of 
aid disbursement procedures.”162 
 
Even when the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper is well formulated, the 
monitoring of its implementation and process is another uneasy target. For this 
purpose, several poverty monitoring systems (PMS) and strategies have been 
developed. In 2001 the Poverty Monitoring Master Plan was realized and introduced 
the Poverty Monitoring Steering Committee. The committee has approximately 30 
members coming from national and international NGOs as well as other Tanzanian 
CSOs and working groups with specific targets. Since 2002 there is the Poverty 
Policy Week, an annual document which is considered as a forum for public debate 
on domestic policy and development issues. It can be seen as an independent 
scientific report. Another monitoring system is emerging from the Consultative 
Group Meeting (CG), including the government, international donors and members 
of the civil society. Outcomes of these meetings are the Annual Progress Reports. 
With this large number of monitoring instruments and documents, the government 
intends to strengthen the whole monitoring system.163 There is an importance to 
outline the difference between the monitoring of budget spending, which is a 
quantitative measure and the outcome oriented monitoring which focuses rather on 
the qualitative changes through the PRSP process. Furthermore, PRSP-Watch points 
out, that according to some authors, the articulation process of the PRSP includes 
national and international NGOs and other CSOs. However, it also indicates that the 
donors were more likely the dominant actors.164 
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Table 14: Selected Macroeconomic Indicators 
165
 
 
The table above examplifies the expectations that are laid upon the PRSP 
process, but also on the TAS, the MDF and other initiatives. Apart from illustrating 
the real GDP growth rates in a slightly more positive light, moreover it indicates the 
inflation rate. The latter was reaching extraordinary levels in the 1990s and is 
expected to lower to a sustainable stage. 
 
After the publication of the PRSP in the year 2000 the government of Tanzania 
and its developing partners, the CGs, are preparing annual PRSP progress reports. 
These should help evaluating the implemented and outstanding targets of the PRSP 
and  also strengthen its efficiency. Furthermore, it is linked to the commitment of the 
TAS and other related programs. In the first report of 2001 it is also pointed out that 
“[t]he annual process of updating the PRSP will also provide opportunity for periodic 
consultations with a wide range of domestic stakeholders, especially the poor, to 
obtain needed feedback and foster ownership.”166 The realization and impact of these 
consultations which should be part of zonal workshops is hard to measure, but 
nonetheless very interesting to the context of this thesis. 
 
 In the first Progress Report of 2001 the Government states, that during the first 
year of implementation of the PRSP the actions to strengthen Governance 
concentrated around the areas of the fight against corruption, strengthening financial 
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management and control. Moreover, great emphasis was set on strengthening the 
juridical system. The first target acquired the establishment of the Integrated 
Financial Management System (IFMS) to strengthen transparency in government 
expenditures at all levels and thus combat corruption. The IFMS were be fully 
implemented by the years of 2002 and 2003.  Furthermore, offices of the Prevention 
of Corruption Bureau have been expanded to the regional levels. Additionally, it is 
planned to be expanded further to the district levels. A new strategy occurring in this 
field, is the call for an active support from the mass media. 167 
The Human Rights and Good Governance Act was introduced in 2001, together with 
a monitoring committee. Other important institutions employed in this phase, were 
the Ethics Secretariat and a Juridical Ethics Committee.   
Overall, the progress that is surrounding the matter of governance and Good 
Governance does neither include qualitative changes nor measurements. The 
improvements described are only on the institutional level and capacity but does not 
report on other important components, like transparency and accountability. There is 
no evident sign that the government or the PRSP are also aiming to create a better 
relationship between the citizens and the authorities. It is only claimed, that the 
process of implementation and evaluation would encourage participation. This 
expectation, among others, could remain unfulfilled. It may be caused by a missing 
definition of Good Governance and, henceforth, a false understanding of priorities 
within this important development program which the PRSP represents. However, 
the government of Tanzania is since the mid 1990s understanding this policy as a 
commitment to the combating of corruption and does not obligate itself with targets 
concerning its status and relation with the society.  
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The National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty 
 
 The National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty (NSGRP), in 
Swahili known as MKUKUTA (Mkakati wa Kukuza Uchumi na Kuondoa Umaskini 
Tanzania) was published by the government of Tanzania, in 2005. It represents a 
national strategy that is concerned with the same goals like the MDGs, the PRSP and 
similar development plans. At the same time, it represents the second generation of 
the PRSP, since it includes not only the lessons learned from the progress reports but 
also from several other review reports and consultations. Furthermore, the strategy 
“(...) strives to widen the space for country ownership and effective participation of 
civil society, private sector development and fruitful local and external partnerships 
in development and commitment to regional and other international initiatives for 
social and economic development.”168  
The strategy builds on the PRSP and its reviews, as well as the Poverty Policy Week 
conferences and is planned for 5 years, meeting the same end point, such as the 
National Poverty Eradication Strategy from 1997. It unites the goals of the MDGs 
which are to be completed by 2015, and the longer term goals of Vision 2025.   
The NSGRP also presents some weaknesses of the PRSP process, which are 
basically resulting from a tight timeline, infrequent consultations with the 
stakeholders and a general lack of communication strategies. Moreover, the 
synchronization with TAS did not succeed and CSO involvement was very limited 
due to its inadequate understanding and resources.169 Therefore, the NSGRP aims at 
encouraging and ensuring participation along the line of human rights, giving a 
special focus on the freedom of opinion, media, information and association. The 
local governments are central for the communication at the grass-roots level. For the 
realization of these approaches, capacity building at all levels is needed.170 The debt 
relief achieved through the articulation and implementation of the PRSP did not 
provide the expected improvements in priority sectors (i.e. education, health, water, 
agriculture, rural roads, judiciary and land). After three years the poverty level and 
inequality levels remain still considerably high.171 The NSGRP is set out to be an 
“outcome-approach” to raise the efficiency.    
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Table 15: MKUKUTA clusters in relation  
 
172
 
 
The chart above is taken from the NSGRP. It presents a graphic simplification of the 
relations between the major problems and, hence, it additionally targets at Tanzania’s 
development. 
 
The major clusters of the NSGRP are 1) growth and reduction of income 
poverty, 2) improved quality of life and social well-being and 3) good governance 
and accountability. The document states that the third cluster provides possibilities to  
essentially fulfill the former two. However, the articulation of concrete actions and 
strategies which ought to ensure that good governance and accountability will be 
implemented remains unsatisfying. On the one hand, the commitment to this policy 
is held up, as for example in this sentence: “NSGRP recognizes public access to 
information as a human right as well as a key means to facilitating effective policy 
implementation, monitoring and accountability.”173; on the other hand, the only real 
actions which are described are institutional changes and reforms on several different 
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sectors, for example: local governments, legal sector, public service, financial sector 
and so on, which aim it is to contribute towards good governance.174 Relating to this 
cluster, the impression can be made, that the leadership did not evaluate the 
experiences of institutional changes and their impact on governance and 
government’s performance to the same strengthening levels as the others.  
The table beneath portrays the goals and additional targets for the third 
cluster. The improvements that are pointed out in the table are one of a qualitative 
nature. The NSGRP also addresses strategies to reach those goals, which include 
capacity building and further implementation of the National Framework on Good 
Governance, increasing participation of vulnerable groups (for example women, 
children, people with disabilities etc.), as well as the separation of powers between 
legislation, judiciary and executive. Moreover, the strengthening of local authorities 
and governments is addressed as a crucial component of successful good 
governance.175 
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Table 16: Goals and Targets of MKUKUTA’s Cluster III 
176
 
 
177
 
 
The NSGRP offers a deeper commitment to good governance and its components 
than programs and strategies that have been introduced in Tanzania previously. 
However, the articulation of concrete actions to reach the goals appointed in the 
document does not seem innovative. Measures, such as, decentralization of power, 
capacity building and enhancing participation, have been already addressed in the 
previous programs as well. Even though they have not been directly linked to the 
matter of Good Governance. Hence, the NSGRP does indeed represent a far more 
prepared and inclusive document than the PRSP of 2000. In the articulation the 
government not identified mistakes from previous documents but particularly 
described how these shall be improved. In the case of good governance, valid efforts 
have been made but still need focus and attention because of their qualitative 
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inheritance. It is obvious, that in contrast to the PRSP the articulation process of 
NSGRP did include national and international actors of interest which strengthen the 
government’s commitment to the underprivileged of the country. However, as the 
following table shows the integration of the people into the most important national 
development plan is leaking. 
 
Table 17: National Awareness of MKUKUTA 
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Chapter IV: 
 
Good Governance versus Political Culture 
 
 The aim of this chapter is to finally connect the two major pillows of this 
thesis and to explore their relationship to one another. On the theoretical level, the 
question arises whether good governance and political culture are interrelated and if 
so in what way. Furthermore, I will look whether they can function in complete 
separation. Additionally it is also important, to examine the power of these two 
theoretical fields in practise and describe their influence on the citizens of Tanzania. 
This chapter and the following will introduce my findings in this field, which will 
deal with my personal experiences during my research and subsequent stay in Dar es 
Salaam.  
  
First of all, there is a need to recapitulate the definition and aim of Good 
Governance as a term, as well as a tool in the hands of the IFIs and donors. For its 
full understanding it is necessary to shortly explain the historical events which 
ultimately lead to the term Good Governance and to the current international 
development politics.  
As aforementioned, Good Governance appeared on the political scene after 
the failing efforts of establishing of sustainable development and growth through 
financial aids in the years before 1990. At the same time, Good Governance was the 
perfect expression for the victory of democracy and market economy over socialism 
and central planed economy in the years after the end of the Cold War.  
After the most African developing countries like Tanzania became 
independent in the early 1960s the international strategy to help these new states 
develop themselves focused on the distribution of loans.  This strategy proved to be 
successful during the post-World War II period and the rebuilding of European 
countries and their economies, which became widely known as the Marshall Plan. 
This recovery programme relied mainly in the hands and responsibility of the Bretton 
Woods Institutions, namely the IMF and the World Bank. After the end of 
colonization and the raising of new countries especially on the African continent, the 
same institutions became automatically concerned with the economical development 
of the new nations. The adaptation of similar strategies for enhancing economic 
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growth as were used in Europe did fail in the African context, because there was not 
enough to build upon. Industries were rare and basically nonexistent; the only 
economical forces that were built up in Africa during the colonial period were 
relying on agriculture. Hence, the loans which flew into the young African states 
often resulted in corruption affairs, instable governments and in some cases even in 
civil wars. The failure to establish growing economies under democratic 
governments became a painful experience for the African continent. The 
international development policies led the countries into deeper dependence not only 
on external financial resources but also on other goods to fulfil the people’s basic 
needs. When it became clear in the 1980s that the development strategy relying on 
loans failed, the IMF offered a restructuring of debt trough a Structural Adjustment 
Facility to lend money to those economies in order to help them repay their debts. 
Dambisa Moyo states in this context: "Necessary though this was, the end result only 
served to increase poor countries' aid-dependence and put them deeper into debt."179  
The case was slightly different in Tanzania where the government was 
relatively stable and the Nyerere regime was accompanied with a strong commitment 
on self-reliance. But none the less the loan policies left the country, among numerous 
others, heavily indebted and henceforth, in continuing dependence. While the IFIs 
and donors recognized that their development strategy did not lead to the expected 
economical growth, nor did it reduce poverty, they started a wide number of other 
initiatives. The UN became deeply involved into the development of its poorest 
members, mainly through the UNDP and additional programmes. Furthermore, 
independent organizations concerned with growth and development in the Third 
World countries established themselves in all parts of the world. Their work for 
development, based on projects in the field, reminds strongly on the missionary 
activities which took place before and during colonization. Their aim was not only to 
help the poor people but primarily to civilize them.  
In this context it is also important to mention another aspect of world politics 
which had a strong and lasting impact on the development agenda. While the African 
countries were busy building up state structures and ensuring basic needs for their 
citizens, the industrialized countries were having a battle on their own, namely the 
Cold War. This situation did not make it any easier for the developing countries 
which closed themselves together in the Non-Alignment Movement. This movement 
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enabled them to act as a unit and to some extend protect their common interests on 
international level. At the same time these countries wanted to prevent themselves of 
becoming involved in the Cold War.  
 
As I have previously referenced, the international development strategy of 
loans pushed by the IFI’s and donors, most of who were the previous colonial 
powers, lead the African states into even deeper financial problems. The advice 
which was a part of the aid programmes did not lead to economical growth but to 
more dependence on foreign expertise and vulnerability to international market 
changes. Whenever there was an international financial crisis, the developing 
countries were affected by it tremendously. As aforementioned, the international oil 
crisis in the 1970s and the following international debt crisis in the 1980s both had a 
strong influence on the Tanzanian state and its economy. With the international 
development policies based on loans, the industrial countries generated more harm 
than help. Thus is one reason, among others, for the rise of the term Good 
Governance. In the eyes of the IFIs and donors, this expression combines and 
enhances all important components which would ultimately lead to development. 
Development in this context can be roughly described as economic growth and 
sustainability, as well as poverty reduction. The first changes in the international 
development politics came along with the recognition of the deep debts of African 
states and the initiation of the HIPC and PRSP process. At the same time loans 
became transformed into grants and other forms of bilateral and multilateral 
contracts. However, these measures did not elevate the dependence on foreign 
money, technology and to some extent ideology. 
 
“Aid has not lived up to expectations. It remains at the heart of the 
development agenda, despite the fact that there are very compelling 
reasons to show that it perpetuates the cycle of poverty and derails 
sustainable economic growth.”180 
 
Almond and Verba stated that political culture is crucial for the functioning of 
political systems. Furthermore, they claim that: “[t]he relationship between political 
culture and political structure becomes one of the most significant researchable 
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aspects of the problem of political stability and change.”181 Examining Tanzania’s 
political culture, it is important to focus on the periods of colonial rule as its starting 
point. The struggle for independence was one of the most significant experiences to 
the Tanzanian people. Moreover, it contributed to the creation of  a shared national 
feeling among its citizen. From the beginning of independence in 1961, development 
was the major concern of domestic politics and additionally the one preoccupying 
aim of foreign politics and relations. From the 1960s onwards the government of 
Tanzania was dealing with the participation of its citizens in the development 
process, in order to make it a successful endeavour. At the time the most powerful 
group among them were the peasants, who had significant control over the means of 
production and henceforth, the power to influence the political decision-making 
process.182 The government responded by setting up national development plans, 
offering the peasants to participate. The official position changed in the 1970s, when 
the response for development was shifted to the central level and participation was 
expected in the form of implementation.183 This political strategy was deepened with 
the articulation of the official paper and even more in the implementation of the 
Ujamaa villages. The Arusha Declaration from 1967, did not only legitimize the 
government’s policies concerning the economy, but also in the case of agriculture, in 
particular a new approach towards the peasants. Furthermore, the approach towards 
foreign aids changed with the Tanzanian state taking over more responsibility. The 
international development politics were seen as a threat not only to the country’s 
independence but also to its ideology. However, the state could never afford to 
decline aid completely. Hence it became obvious that the state and its power had to 
enhance. On one hand it resulted in further authoritarian character of governance, on 
the other the socialist government also started to politicize the whole society.  
 
Since the independence of Tanzania, there have been governmental advised 
committees in the rural areas that worked as channels of communication between the 
state and the peasants. In the 1970s, along with the villagization a decentralization 
process began, aiming to enhance the government’s power at all levels of the society 
and ultimately increase production. Concerning the Ujamaa villages, the peasants’ 
participation shifted from voluntarism to enforcement. The state party’s commitment 
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to socialism was further enhanced with the transformation of TANU into CCM in 
1977. The pattern of democracy still remained at its core, due to the importance that 
it was imposed by donors who acknowledged this political system as the only one 
that could enable economic growth. However, Moyo claims that "(...) far form being 
a prerequisite for economic growth, democracy can hamper development as 
democratic regimes find it difficult to push through economic beneficial legislation 
amid rival parties and jockeying interests."184 Moyo concludes that democracy is not 
the prerequisite for economic growth however leads to the opposite effect. 
The amount of foreign aid that Tanzania received in the late 1960s and early 
1970s grew steadily. However, these flows of monetary aid lead to an economy that 
slowly but steadily became dependent and hence, vulnerable to external changes.  
That is why the international financial crisis of the late 1970s reached far into the 
social and political sectors in Tanzania. The stability and legitimacy of the political 
system became weakened by this, which in turn lead to further increase of the 
authoritarian state character. Shivji claims that by the end of the 1970s "[t]he 
combination of economic crisis at home and the rise of neo-liberalism globally made 
many an African country a ready victim of the IMF-World Bank structural 
adjustment programmes or SAPs."185 
   
After all, the state was unable to enhance its production and productivity in 
these levels that would ultimately enable sustainable growth and development. What 
it did reach was a tradition of state control at all levels, mainly because of the system 
of local governments which prevails until today. The citizens and specifically the 
peasants, had always the right to participate but only between borders lined out by 
the government in the national plans. Hence, they found their own ways how to work 
through and around this system. They became self-responsible for their own life and 
well being, holding the government accountable for all other sectors especially the 
development of the state as a whole. This is a major characteristic of the political 
culture prevailing among the citizens of Tanzania today.  
From the 1980s onwards, the position of the Tanzanian government towards 
foreign aids and the involvement of foreign countries and institutions in the country’s 
development has changed. From the time when Julius Nyerere resigned from his 
presidency, it became obvious that Tanzania would have to accept economical 
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agreements with the IFIs to overcome its economical crisis and their consequences. 
The first of these agreements was signed under president Mwinyi between the 
government of Tanzania and the IMF.186 It introduced the Economic Recovery 
Programme (ERP) which lead to a market liberalization. Opposite to the expected 
improvements, the policies under this programme brought higher corruption, 
stagnation in the agricultural sector and did not benefited the citizens of Tanzania. 
The power of the IFIs and donors rose after the end of the Cold War and the 
Tanzanian government had no choice but to acknowledge the predominant belief that 
democracy and capitalistic market economy are the pre-requirements for 
development in terms of poverty reduction and economical growth. The 
implementation of the multi-party system, which ended the period of the socialist 
one-party-state in 1992 was unquestionably a decision of the government preferring 
foreign relations over the interests of its people. The election results indicate, that the 
multi-party system as laid out on the paper has not yet been fully realized.  
The table below, which was presented in the Human and Poverty 
Development Report for Tanzania from 2007, shows the people’s views on the multi-
party politics 15 years after its implementation. 
 
Table 18: Perceptions on Single versus Multi-Party Politics 
187
 
 
Furthermore, different rights and improvements that are integral parts of 
democracy are questionable in current Tanzania. In this context, I want to present an 
example of HakiElimu an NGO that I have visited during my stay in Dar es Salaam. 
From my point of view, it was one of the most effective and outstanding organization 
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that, if it became acknowledged by the government, would be a very helpful tool for 
the development of the country.  
 
HakiElimu (right for education) is an NGO founded in 2001 and is primarily 
concerned with the promotion and improvement in the quality of education. 
Furthermore, the organization believes, that quality education that encourages critical 
learning and thinking is primarily linked with human rights and democracy. Hence, 
the major part of the organization’s work is based on encouraging communities in 
rural areas to monitor and address the government’s work with the goal, not only to 
achieve new progress in the education system but also to influence the policy-
making-process. HakiElimu’s understanding of education is one that “(…) promotes 
a culture and practice of human rights, democracy and active citizenship.”188 The 
organization believes that pressure from the public is the most effective way to reach 
the government and enhance its accountability. In their annual reports the 
organization provides information on its work, achievements and challenges, as well 
as recapitulating the vision, goals and strategies, and offers further a financial 
statement for funders and partners. In addition to that, HakiElimu produces cartoon 
booklets, newsletters, TV-spots in Swahili to keep the public informed about its 
policy developments related to the organization targets. These materials are 
distributed not only to individuals and educational institutions but also to other CSOs 
and government departments. Furthermore, there are research studies published by 
the Policy Analysis and Advocacy unit, dealing mainly with the implementation of 
reforms in the education sector and government-citizen relations focused on the 
access to information and accountability of government promises, as well as 
questions concerning budget spending.189 Finally, Working Papers are published, by 
independent authors, as well as those who work for the organization itself. During 
my research in Dar es Salaam I found these papers to be insightful and highly 
informative. In the organization’s understanding independent reports create “(…) 
greater awareness, accountability and policy and public action.”190 
Ever since, HakiElimu has been doing critical research and publishing its 
findings in the national media. In September 2005, the Ministry of Education and 
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Culture banned the organization from these activities. Furthermore, it criticized the 
radio and TV spots for undermining the government’s efforts. This decision was met 
with a lot of criticism from other local NGOs as well as from abroad.191 In 2006 the 
ban was lifted and the organization could continue its work. HakiElimu’s position on 
this dispute is that not only it resolved for the organization’s benefit, moreover, it 
was a step towards creating a civil society and a participatory society. “The 
Government treatment of HakiElimu is a vivid case in point, and the overall situation 
of CSOs is characterized by an uneasy tension when government is criticized.”192  
  
This example illustrates how the government is dealing with criticism and its 
practice of responding on discomforting issues. Ever since the introduction of the 
multi-party system and the implementation of laws regulating civil society and non-
governmental organizations, the raising number of NGOs in Tanzania. They 
established themselves in society and are consulted by the government or organs 
only on certain occasions. This was the case in the articulating process of 
MKUKUTA. The government knew that it was important to implement the expert 
knowledge of these specialized organizations in order to ensure that civil society 
participation was adhered on the papers. This was the case with REPOA (Research 
on Poverty Alleviation) an NGO based in Dar es Salaam. REPOA specializes in 
economic and social research and Hakikazi Catalyst, a CSO which I have visited in 
Arusha. Both of these organizations participated in the MKUKUTA articulation 
process. REPOA is currently one of the countries’ leading research organizations and 
receives funds from foreign governments as well as from the government of 
Tanzania itself. Furthermore, it does research upon request from the WB, UN 
agencies, etc. Their approach is to deliver constructive criticism to the government 
and the public. Hakikazi’s work is based in the field of empowering the people 
especially in rural areas to hold their government accountable, address it with their 
demands and participate in political decisions. They also translate and simplify 
policy papers into booklets and cartoons to raise public awareness about the 
government’s plans, aiming to enhance a bottom-up influence on decision making. 
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The organization is not as critical as HakiElimu,. They try to work in cooperation 
with the government and its plans rather than in confrontation. Hence, they are trying 
to contribute in reaching the country’s goals which are targeted in the several 
development plans.193 During my interviews with both of these organizations, the 
interview partners described that the donors do play a major role in the government’s 
decisions and plans, however they have difficulties to understand the complexity of 
the country’s problems. Moreover, they agreed that the donors’ approach is slowly 
changing and acknowledging previous mistakes.194 
In spite of the fact that representatives of REPOA and Hakikazi Catalyst tried 
to highlight the improvements in the articulation of the development plans, however 
the government’s response on criticism remains slow and the importance of it 
underestimated. The previously referenced example of HakiElimu clearly displays 
the government’s ongoing effort to control its society, civil society and the borders of 
criticism. Even to this day state control remains a great force at all levels of  society, 
even if this state character speaks against the concept of Good 
Governance agenda. Instead of enhancing the transparency factor in its own rank, the 
government still attempts to silence critical voices. The emphasis the leaders put on 
components like transparency and accountability is more of a good will game 
towards the IFIs than a reliable promise to its citizens.    
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My personal experiences in Dar es Salaam 
 
The aim of this final chapter is to give the reader a broader understanding of 
the Tanzanian society, its political and social commitments as I have experienced 
during my stay in Dar es Salaam. I have to admit, that my everyday life there, taught 
me more about the complex situation in the country, than any literature I could have 
read. I want to share the knowledge I have acquired, in order to express my sincere 
gratefulness to the people of Tanzania.   
 
My journey began with an overnight stay at the International Airport in Doha, 
where I met a young woman from Kenya who lived in Vienna for two years at that 
time. During our conversation I told her about my trip and research ambitions and 
she shared her point of view on the Tanzanian society with me, especially pointing 
out the difference to the people in Kenya. She explained that the people in Tanzania 
still trust their government to solve their problems. In Kenya everybody knows that 
only he himself is responsible for his life and well-being. Therefore, the people 
therefore act under the principle of Charles Darwin’s “survival of the fittest”. She 
mentioned that the people in Kenya want to be like the people in the USA – even 
when their perception is based on television. The people in Tanzania struggle to be 
like the people in Kenya, but do not recognize that they are developing too slowly. 
What impressed me most about this woman was her feeling about self-responsibility 
to development when she said: “I have legs and arms. I am healthy so I have to do 
something for my country.”195 As most of the Africans who live in Europe, she is 
sending parts of her salary to her family in Kenya. I saw her strong ambitions and 
wondered how the people in Tanzania would be like.  
I arrived at the Julius Nyerere International Airport on an early afternoon at 
the end of April 2008. Before landing, I already could see how vast the city of Dar es 
Salaam is. My first impressions were made while I was on my way to my hostel 
riding a taxi. I saw people all along the streets, carrying all kinds of goods on their 
heads and on wooden trails. The road we were driving on appeared to be in a bad 
condition with many potholes. However, later on I have learned that a bad condition 
in African terms means far more damage. The taxi driver commented this with the 
words: “Our government is working on other issues now, and we can’t do anything 
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without our government.”196 This sentence, later on, appeared to be very 
representative to the Tanzanian’s position towards their government and its 
commitments.   
My first glimpses of Tanzanian life were based on public transportations, 
such as, buses and small businesses. It all appeared very lively and colorful, but on 
the other hand also terrifying for a young European woman who visited an African 
country for her very first time. I was seeing houses covered with corrugated iron 
roofs, like I used to be shown in documentary movies about the poor, without a clue 
that I would find myself living under one of these as well, in just a few weeks.  
The hostel that I have previously booked via Internet is situated in a village 
called Changanyikeni. It is located on a hill near the University of Dar es Salaam 
(UDSM) and about 13km from the city center away. The asphalt road ends at half  
way between the village and the university. The village has approximately 2000 
inhabitants. Many of these are the students and the professors. The Eastern Africa 
Statistical Training Centre is also located in this village and I have been told that it is 
one of the best statistics schools in Africa.  
By the time I arrived in Dar es Salaam it was rain season. On the second day 
of my stay, I have discovered what this means in reality. Within minutes the dust 
roads, that are covered with potholes, transformed into a muddy ground bearing 
dangers for pedestrians, passengers and even more so for vehicles. My first 
experiences with public transportation happened the day I arrived and was seeking 
for a public phone or Internet to get in touch with my family. The buses are actually 
cars that in Europe are allowed to carry 9 persons, including the driver. However, in 
Tanzania they carry the driver, a conductor and have seats for 12 to 15 persons, 
depending on their body size and luggage. There is also room enough for at least 5 
passengers to stand. Naturally, they are not always fully loaded when driven, 
however there was this one ride when I counted 28 people inside a car, including 
myself. Some buses are bigger and can carry at least twice this number of people. 
School children are allowed to travel for free if they are wearing their uniforms. The 
conductors however, do not like this regulation and during rush hours allow only a 
few of school kids on their bus.  
The infrastructure of the city of Dar es Salaam is a typical example of a 
rapidly growing city without planning. Some people there are of the opinion that ¾ 
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of the city are slums. My impression is that, probably around 60% of the housings 
are slums. The main roads are asphalt roads, the side roads are mostly out of dust. In 
the city center, the areas where international organizations and embassies, 
government buildings as well as big hotels are located are asphalt roads. However, 
there is lack of sewerage system which causes major flooding during the rainy 
season. I was lucky that I never experienced this myself; however I have had the 
chance to see it on the news a couple of times. The unplanned growth of the city 
raises several more problems, for example insufficient water and electricity supply. 
Moreover, one of the city’s major problems is the high number of unemployed 
people. The city centre is a perfect example where even tourists can experience the 
consequences of this growth. The frequently visited places, such as, the big bus 
stands etc. there are a lot of young men who earn their living with selling their art. 
Most of this art are postcards and paintings of typical Tanzanian scenarios like 
Massai men in traditional clothing or women carrying baskets on their heads. The 
prizes are negotiable, hence I cannot tell how much they really earn and if it is indeed 
enough for them to make a living. When they speak about themselves, they use 
phrases like “I have to travel to work for two hours each morning.” which creates the 
impression of a real labor condition not only to the listener but also for themselves. 
On the other hand, they might say good bye with the words “Visit me next time 
you’re in town. I’ll be under my tree.”, which describes the location of their 
workplace.   
The difference between the tourist and non-tourist season in Dar es Salaam is 
easy to recognize. During my stay I witnessed the change in people’s behavior 
during the end of June and the beginning of July. Suddenly, there were more beggars 
on the streets, knowingly looking for tourists. Before they were not only fewer, they 
were also not focused on begging from foreigners. During this time it also happened 
to me a few times, that the conductors in the public busses tried to charge me higher 
prices. Sadly they did not succeed because I knew the correct prices, as well as how 
to ask for my change. The number of so called “flycatchers” also increased rapidly. 
The flycatchers are people working for small companies which offer safaris, trips to 
Zanzibar, and so forth. They walk along the tourist trails and try to “catch” as many 
tourists as they can, to bring them into their bosses office. I have been in a couple of 
these offices and at least I could make myself a picture of the service they provided. 
In the eyes of a European, their efforts are appreciable, but they do not necessarily 
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one of their professionalism. Even though I would not doubt that they do not provide 
the service which they are offering at their best efforts, I think they are losing most of 
their potential customers because there are countless companies offering the same 
services for almost the same price. Approximately the same is happening to other 
businesses. On some streets of Dar es Salaam the business owners specialize on 
some goods, for example furniture. Customers know that if they are looking for a 
new table, bed or something of that assortment of goods, they can find it at that 
particular street. At the same time the business owners are in constant competition 
over the customers and are forced to negotiate their prices to lower levels, instead of 
working together and be able to widen their range of products. In Tanzania, people 
have a strong feeling of self-responsibility for their well being. They complain on 
unfulfilled government promises and bad luck, but they are also making serious 
efforts to improve their life situation. For example I found out that one watchman at 
the hostel where I stayed the first 4 weeks, had to pay half of his monthly salary  on 
public transportation in order to come to work every day. After a long time of saving 
money he managed to buy himself a bicycle – worth a 2 months’ salary.  This 
recognition and the practical realization impressed me very much.  
Due to high unemployment the people seek for self-employment. Like the 
street artists, who are mostly underage, there are lots of men and women selling 
goods in the city and around the city center. Women are selling fruits and fried fish, 
which they carry typically on their heads. Their typical customers are not tourists but 
ordinary Tanzanians who are used to buy food on the street. In the areas that follow 
the city center and where bigger companies are located, the streets are full of people 
who sell food especially around noon time. One can buy different kinds of fruits and 
sugarcane juices and pieces of fresh fruits, fried or cooked cassava, barbecued meat 
on sticks, maize and so on. In the evenings, when most of the people are on their way 
home from work, the bigger bus terminals transfer into markets with an even wider 
variety of take away food. To me, those were incredible opportunities to experience 
the local cuisine, but as I have been told, to buy this kind of food every day is 
financially not advisable. For a foreigner like me, those were  special moments where 
I saw and felt the cultural difference between the developed and developing world in 
a positive light. However the reality behind this, did not draw necessarily such a nice 
picture. This is another part of the problem with the employment situation in Dar es 
Salaam. These people who sell the food on the streets are self-employed, those who 
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are their customers and mostly enjoy the privilege of an employment contract have in 
most cases working hours which Europeans could legally not afford, and hence have 
to buy their breakfast, lunch and dinner as a take away. As far as my impression 
goes, the government is not successful in dealing with this situation of high 
unemployment on the one hand and bad working conditions in the formal sector on 
the other. The efforts are made to integrate the informal sector into the legal system. 
Often I had the impression, that the poorer people get, the harder they are trying to 
sell something. In Tanzania, a lot of those who work on the streets speak about their 
work as their business. It is true that a lot of courage and creativity is needed to earn 
one’s living with such work.  
Other versions of self-employment that are parts of the informal sector 
concern the selling of all kinds of goods from water to shoes, newspapers, cashew 
nuts, DVDs, chargers for cell phones etc. The people who sell those items are 
seeking their customers in cafés, between cars on the streets and at bus stops. All of 
their prizes are negotiable and the origin of the goods they sell is questionable. In 
better cases, they bought it at a market for a low prize, but sometime it seems that 
those items might have been stolen.197 Hence, the issue of unemployment is closely 
linked to criminal behavior and in some cases even be encouraging this behavior. 
Shortly after my arrival I have noticed the overwhelming presence of police 
and military officers in the public space is very high. Additionally to that, there were 
also many private security companies that had their own staff guarding banks, hotels 
etc. Even the hostel where I stayed hired three watchmen who worked in shifts, 
during the nights. It gave me a certain feeling of confidence when I saw policemen 
on the streets, who at least winked at me, to signal everything is alright. On the other 
hand, I have heard various stories about police brutality and even more of rough 
treatment of the militaries. This problem, which has been described to me by the 
locals, is strongly related to corruption. As in almost all sectors of public services the 
salaries of the police officers are very low, which makes them very prone to engage 
in corruption. Even the people complain about the ongoing corruption in high 
political an economical ranks, however are very tolerant towards bribery on lower 
levels. Hence it is no problem to ride a car without a driving license or under the 
influence of alcohol, if you have enough cash with you. On the surface it seems, that 
little payments to police officers are not causing that much harm, and those citizens 
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who engage in these transactions perceive it on the one hand as a means to seek help 
from the police and on the other as helping them financially. But in my eyes, the 
attitude towards bribery within society is a huge hindering factor in the government’s 
fight against corruption and it even contributes in widening the problem as it is. The 
table below makes the acceptance of bribery in the society very clear. 
 
Table 19: Contact with Government Services and Whether Bribe was Paid 
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During my stay, I also learned more about the bureaucratic system in 
Tanzania, when I was struggling to receive permission for visiting and useing the 
library of the University of Dar es Salaam. According to their homepage, foreigners 
and foreign researchers have to pay a fee which permits them access to the library for 
a duration of three months. However, when I first arrived there and asked for this 
permit, the staff sent me around from office to another until I was finally told that I 
have to get a letter of recommendation from a professor of the University of Vienna. 
The problem was that the University of Vienna and the UDSM have an agreement 
within the Joint Study programme. According to the staff, I could not be treated as a 
foreign researcher because of this agreement, even when I came to Tanzania without 
engaging the Joint Study programme. In the end it took me almost two weeks, to 
contact a professor in Vienna who would write me a letter of recommendation that I 
could present to the responsible person in the library. I received a stamp on the copy 
of that e-mail, which later on served as my ID and allowed me to use the library for 
17 days. Luckily it that was all the time that I needed there and it was just one of 
several libraries in the city. I found it ironic, how much effort and time it took me to 
get the permission, regardless of the information which the UDSM provided on the 
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Internet. Regardless I have to say that all the staff have been helpful and nice, as well 
as, teaching me patience towards the African time conception.  
After I have spent a month in a hostel, I have made several friends at the 
Changanyikeni village and was invited to stay at a young woman’s apartment for the 
rest of my sojourn. She lived at the other end of the village in a two room apartment. 
Moving to her place and additionally experiencing living under the same conditions 
(the previously mentioned corrugated iron roof) like many other people in Dar es 
Salaam was a very impressive experience to me. The apartment was part of a block 
of 5 apartments which belonged to a landlord, whose house was located there as 
well. In the middle was a standpipe which supplied the people of these apartments 
however also other nearby houses. The distribution and the costs were divided 
between all of them. It was filled with clean (not drinking) water which arrived in a 
truck once a week. On the days when the water was brought, the standpipe was 
occupied for hours when all the people came to gather the water into huge buckets 
which they would keep at home. My roommate told me, that you can use the water 
for cooking, only if you gather it fresh. After standing in the pipe for more than two 
days, it can be only used for cleaning dishes, washing clothes and bathing. It never 
occurred to me before, how much water a person needs every day, until I had to go 
out for water just to be able to take a shower or wash a shirt. Furthermore, I have 
experienced how it is when the water supply is not on time. . It occasionally happens 
that without any further explanation the truck with clean water comes one or even 
two days later that it should. If one expects this, it would probably cause less trouble 
but the water was scarce even if it came on time. On those occasions where it came 
late, we had to buy some water for cooking, give some to our neighbors and cut back 
on water where it was possible. The cost of drinking water from the shop, compared 
to the water which is brought by the truck is beyond the means of many people. The 
value of water as one of the most necessary resources for life and living obviously 
got lost in our culture of prosperity. Similar is the case with the value of food and 
knowledge about nutrition.  
After I have spent lots of time with Tanzanians of different societal ranks, I 
have learned how they value food. The typical breakfast for many people is a strong 
black tea with herbs (Indian chai), milk and lots of sugar, which counts for a whole 
meal. Of course there are many foods available for breakfast, most of them fried like 
chapati ( a kind of bread, originally from India), rice flour balls and others. 
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Nonetheless, the tea remains the foremost kind of breakfast. Most Tanzanians eat 
only one proper dish per day, mostly in the early evening. In Europe, the main parts 
on our plates are meat with a vegetable sauce which we eat with potatoes, pasta, rice 
etc. In Tanzania the main part is maize, rice, potatoes or cooked bananas, meat and 
vegetables are on the side. The reason is not only that the rice and maize is cheaper 
and more available, it also contains more calories and fills the stomach for a longer 
period of time. In Tanzanian terms it “makes you strong”. Even when I could afford 
to buy European style food in Tanzania, I ate the same as the people there and can 
tell that the cuisine is not poor at all, especially when it comes to vegetables and 
spices. A big advantage is also the availability of fresh fruits that the country offers, 
as such. Concerning the nutrition it is also important to mention the importance of 
soda drinks. Soda drinks from the Coca-Cola Company and Pepsi Company are 
highly popular among Tanzanian’s. They are usually offered to guests and are also 
refreshments at other occasions. Unlike in Europe where we drink soft drinks in high 
doses, in Tanzania they are sold in small recycled bottles. One day I was invited to a 
neighbor who lived nearby. It was early afternoon and he was at home with his 
grandmother only. He made us sit down in the front yard and served us each a bottle 
of soda. His grandmother, who was religious, made a cross in front of her chest 
before she took the first sip, as a lot of people here do before eating. If people in the 
European countries would be aware that even sodas are a part of their daily nutrition 
we might have less problems with overweight as a societal disease. During my visit 
at my friend’s home, we were talking a lot about differences between cultures. He 
asked me whether if it was true, that we in Europe “give our old people in special 
houses” instead of living with them. This was an instance when I felt deeply ashamed 
about our culture. He was right with his assumption and even when I tried to explain 
that life in Europe is much faster and apparently so complex that we do not have the 
time to take care of our older generation anymore, I admitted that there is nothing to 
this practice that would make it appreciable.  
The views on Europeans that prevail in the Tanzanian society to this day 
astonished me to a great deal. At first I was confronted with the predominant 
perception that all Europeans are rich and healthy. When I was walking down street, 
regardless in what part of the city, I was constantly greeted. A greeting in Tanzania is 
far more than a “Hello, how are you?”, especially when you are of white skin. 
Everyone wants to be your friend and know everything about you. This meant in my 
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case that most of the people greeted me were men. Some of them were not even 
embarrassed to reveal to me, that they would like to marry me and come with me to 
Europe. They did not mean it in any offensive way, but walking around and 
appearing to be a free ticket to prosperity certainly did not give me much confidence. 
However in other cases, the people just wanted to welcome me to their country and 
ask me about my visit. I had difficulties dealing with the fact that I was always 
provoking attention and that so many people wanted to talk with me. Later on I 
learned to handle it better and tried to make the best out of it. When I got malaria, 
which happened during my fifth week in Dar es Salaam, many people expressed how 
sorry they were and at the same time told me that now I have the full Africa 
experience. Some people were also astonished and I have been told that until today 
there is still the believe that white people never get sick. One day, our landlords’ 
daughter invited me over for oranges. She was exited to speak with me because she 
was attending a private school that teaches in English and she believed she could 
learn this way something from me. First she was surprised, that English was not my 
mother tongue. I explained to her, that each nation in Europe has their own first 
language and English is in most cases the second language that is taught in schools. 
In Tanzania the importance is laid upon the international language, however the 
knowledge among the citizens is very poor. English is taught in private schools that 
only rich people can afford for their children. Furthermore, there are secondary 
schools, which are by far not attended by all children. The quality of teaching in 
public schools is mostly poor, especially in the rural areas. In our conversation, we 
talked a lot about differences between our cultures. I have learned that the picture 
that the film industry presents in their movies and sitcoms is the one which prevails 
in people’s heads. The young woman asked me how it is possible that all people in 
Europe are slim and how it works that women recover so fast after giving birth. I told 
her not to believe what the movies show and that reality is almost always the 
opposite. Other differences in our cultures concern the values we have in life. 
 In Tanzanian’s society still the most important goals are considered  
marriage, having a big and healthy family. But in the first place, people want to 
achieve a stable financial ground for themselves and later on for their families. That 
is why so many people seek to come to Europe and earn as much money as possible. 
I have tried to explain what usually happens to Africans who come to Europe the 
difficulties they immediately face and disillusionment. I did not talk about laws 
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which make it almost impossible to stay and work under legal conditions. I was 
trying to make the point what racism means in these territories, which are the 
predominant challenges for Africans living in European countries. It appeared to be 
impossible to make it clear, because the opinion prevails that a white person is 
always worth more. This became even more obvious to me on several different 
occasions, for instance, in buses when I was offered a better seat, in restaurants when 
I got served first and especially during conversations when I tried to make a point 
that we are all the same, no matter where we live on and how wealthy or poor we are. 
The disillusioning cognition came to me that racism has spread so far, as to the 
people’s minds and appears to be the norm. Dealing with this fact was difficult to 
me, especially when I tried to talk a friend out of his plans to come to Europe no 
matter what it costs. At least I convinced him, to keep on trying it the legal way and 
not to risk his life for something which appears to be a dream but could ultimately 
end in a nightmare.  
Every time I got the chance, I have tried to gather some of people’s views on 
development and responsibility. It is truly not in the Tanzanian character to complain 
much about things which one himself cannot change. People usually do not engage 
in the debate concerning responsibility for the country’s development. Moreover, 
they are struggling to support and ensure the well-being of their families. A lot of 
people with regular incomes who live in towns are sending money to their relatives 
in rural areas, especially to support those who are receiving education. This is a very 
important concern to all, because it is widely acknowledged that a solid education is 
the first and most important step towards a prosperous future. The best choice is 
private schooling, which unfortunately remains a privilege for wealthy children. The 
public schools lack in quality of the teaching, but in some cases can also provide 
good education. Children who attend public secondary schools and later on 
universities have to put in a lot of effort, that is incomparable to the effort which is 
displayed by European students. This is how new elites are build and the future 
leaders of the country are selected. Concerning the development of the country the 
citizens’ count on their government. They admit that the progress is slow and the 
results are rather poor, however they hope and trust in the development. I was 
positively surprised when I saw, how interested the people are in progress and in 
their country. Every day I saw people standing around newsstands and reading the 
headlines. Buying the newspapers would be too expensive which the salesmen 
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understand and this is why they let them read it for free, or at least read the front 
page or the headlines. In the evening people come together in bars and watch the 
news on TV, those are the times when the bars are populated the most. They show 
many programmes regarding domestic news and only very little on international 
issues. Not one day goes by, when at least one of the headlines, whether in the 
newspapers or at the news on TV talks about new contracts with development 
partners, organizations or donors. The huge sums of money are exposed as the 
government’s achievements along with promises, of investing this money in 
infrastructure, health care, and so on. It made me wonder, why the people were not 
complaining more about the insufficient fulfillment of these promises, because of 
this overly presence in the media which also creates the impression of populism 
among the side of the development partners. The government is basically only 
raising quantitative data which are presented to the public eye and internationals, but 
the qualitative improvements which would be felt directly by the citizens are still 
rare. Hence it would be false to say, that the citizens have apathy on the issues of 
development. Moreover, I got the impression that they rely on their leaders like they 
did once on Julius Nyerere, whom they called the nation’s teacher.199 Even when the 
political landscape changed in recent years, through the implementation of multi-
party politics and the wider and deeper involvement of international organizations 
and others into the domestic politics, the people’s perceptions remained almost 
unchanged. This fact speaks a lot for the politics and it ensures the stability of the 
system, on the other hand it is another sign that the government in the past and in the 
presence remains unsuccessful in its efforts to engage its citizens in the development.       
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 The name often appears as “Mwalimu Julius K. Nyerere”, which in Swahili means teacher.  
Conclusion: 
 
 In my diploma thesis I sought to connect the different levels of international 
development politics with domestic concern in political culture. Throughout my 
research I came across many studies that shared a variety of aspects with either one 
of the field. However, they never seemed to intervene. My main focus was to find a 
connection between these two levels, in order to obtain a different angle on 
international development politics and strategies and their subsequent impact in their 
respective target countries. I selected Tanzania for a number of reasons. First of all, 
because of its unique political history within the African countries, as well as 
because of my previous knowledge of the Swahili language. Finally, I decided to 
take a further look at “Good Governance.” This expression emerged in recent years 
on the political scene and has ever since become a synonym for political strategies of 
development politics.  Moreover, it has expanded the concept and understanding of 
democracy. Despite lacking a clear and finite definition, it does provide a set of 
values among which some can clearly be attributed to the domain of political culture. 
 
Since the end of the Cold War the development policies and strategies of the 
International Organizations and donors were widely extended by political 
conditionalities. “Good Governance” provides a link between the ideological values 
and the demands laid on Third World countries’ governments, which rely on the 
support from the IFIs and donors. Ever since the involvement of these organizations 
in the domestic politics of the target countries is rising. 
In Tanzania, this involvement resolved in changes like economical 
liberalization and the introduction of multi-party politics. Furthermore, it led to many 
other modifications of laws, regulations and on institutional levels. The government 
however, did those changes primarily upon the demand of foreign interests instead of 
answering to domestic claims. The enhancement of political participation and the 
establishment of a civil society which are both important components of Good 
Governance were not yet achieved to satisfactory levels.  
The integration of the citizens into the development process proved to be a 
struggle for the government ever since its independence. During Nyerere’s regime, 
this integration was partly successful, the citizens were aware of the national 
strategies. The mobilization and participation of the people was foremost voluntary, 
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but at times as well upon compulsion. The citizens have found their own strategies to 
work around these regulations, which prevail until today. The government was not 
successful to implement the nation’s development as a collective responsibility. On 
the contrary, the regulations and limitations of participation that were established 
during the time of African Socialism are still fundamental to peoples’ attitudes. They 
rely on their leaders and show very little efforts for the greater good. The 
involvement of international interests in the domestic policies, which are crucial for 
the receiving of aids, widened the gap between the government and its citizens. From 
the 1990s on the CSOs and NGOs were established. They continually are making 
efforts to enhance participation and to create a bottom-up development process.  
The former single party CCM is stable and confident in its role as the leaders 
of the nation. The election results prove that the opposition parties have only very 
little impact on the political landscape in Tanzania. This confidence is one of the 
chief reasons why the enhancement of political participation in terms of a critical 
society is not popular in the government’s ranks. Moreover, the participation which 
is requested only if it fits the official plan has become a traditional approach even for 
the citizens. The values of the government have shifted over time, from an emphasis 
on nationality and strong commitment to the nation towards meeting foreign 
demands. The reason for this can be located in the country’s history and in the 
pressure that is put upon the government by the IFIs and donors. The government 
and its country as a whole are heavily dependent on foreign aid. These grant can only 
be obtained upon fulfilment of these conditionalities. Hence, the government is 
bound to these requests that in the other hand should be beneficiary for the citizens. 
This top-down approach of development politics does not fulfil its goals, but remains 
the foremost strategy. 
The political culture in Tanzania has slowly changed in the years since its 
independence. The switch from a participatory in the years after independence, to a 
rather passive position during the times of Ujamaa. After the change of the official 
position towards the involvement on the IFIs and donors into Tanzania’s politics, the 
citizens are confronted with a new situation. Their representatives are making big 
promises upon the background of received aids. Moreover, the international interests 
are put on top of political outputs. The IFIs and donors are very present in the public 
to almost the same extend as the government itself, but none of them are taking over 
responsibility for the lacking success of the development process. The citizens 
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however, lost confidence that their voices will be still heard and answered by their 
leaders. Under these circumstances the political system can still remain stable, as 
well as the development process which is slow and not satisfactory. Unless both, the 
government and its donors acknowledge the importance of political participation and 
a critical civil society, this trend will continue and development will remain an issue 
of higher ranks. 
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Appendix : 
 
Official definitions of terms used in OECD/DAC studies: 
“Bilateral official development assistance is from one country to 
another.”200 
 
“Untied bilateral official development assistance is assistance from 
country to country for which the associated goods and services may be 
fully and freely procured in substantially all countries.”201 
 
“Imports and imported value of goods (merchandise) are goods that add 
to the stock of material resources of a country by entering its economic 
territory.”202 
 
“Goods admitted free of duties are exports of goods (excluding arms) 
received from developing countries and admitted without tariffs to 
developed countries.”203 
 
“There is no established convention for the designation of developed and 
developing countries or areas in the United Nations system.”204 
 
“Debt relief committed under HIPC Initiative (in United States dollars) 
as a component of official development assistance has been recorded in 
different ways over time. (…) Since 1993, forgiveness of debt originally 
intended for military purposes has been reportable as “other official 
flows”, while forgiveness of other non- ODA loans (mainly export 
credits) recorded as ODA has been included in both country data and 
total Committee ODA, as it was until 1989.”205 
 
 
                                                 
200
 UNDG (2003)  : p 71 
201
 UNDG (2003)  : p 73 
202
 UNDG (2003)  : p 76 
203
 UNDG (2003)  : p 76 
204
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Abstract English: 
 
 
In my diploma thesis I examine the impact of the international organizations and 
donors on Tanzania’s political culture. More precisely, I observe the influence trough 
the term “Good Governance” which is the main conditionality laid on the 
government. In my hypothesis, I assume that the domestic decision-making process 
is dominated by the donors’ interests. Thus, the position of the government towards 
its citizens and vice versa is changing as they both drift apart from each other. The 
articulation of the demands is in many cases less concerning those who are affected 
by the circumstance, but is rather done by the international organizations, whose 
economic power is thereby strengthened. This process started with the liberalization 
of the political structure in the 1980s, resulting in the implementation of the multi-
party system in 1992. At the same time Tanzania introduced several development 
programs, which are more or less dominated by international interests.  
The structure of my thesis starts with a theoretical introduction on the basic terms of 
“Political Culture” and “Good Governance”. Furthermore, an analysis is carried out 
on Tanzanias’ political culture at the background of the politics of the African 
Socialism. The most important external and national development programs that 
gained importance since the 1990s are introduced. In the last part of my thesis I 
examine the field of tension of the (post-) African Socialism regime and the concept 
of “Good Governance”, which is responsible for the alteration of Tanzania’s political 
culture. 
 
 
Abstract Deutsch: 
 
In meiner Diplomarbeit gehe ich der Frage nach, welchen Einfluss die 
Internationalen Organisationen und Geldgeber auf die Politische Kultur Tansanias 
haben. Konkret befasse ich mich mit den Einflüssen auf den Entscheidungsprozess 
durch den Begriff „Good Governance“, welcher als Vorbedingung für finanzielle 
Unterstützungen an die Regierung gestellt wird. In meinen Hypothesen vermute ich, 
dass der innenpolitische Entscheidungsprozess von den Interessen der Geldgeber 
dominiert wird. Dadurch verändert sich zwangsläufig die Haltung der Regierung 
gegenüber der Bevölkerung und umgekehrt, beide entfernen sich dabei zunehmend 
voneinander. Die Artikulation der Bedürfnisse obliegt in vielen Fällen nicht den 
Betroffenen, sondern den internationalen Organisationen und mit anderen Worten 
jenen, welche ihre Macht finanziell stützen.  Dieser Prozess hat bereits mit der 
Liberalisierung der politischen Struktur in den 1980er Jahren begonnen, welche zur 
Einführung des Mehr-Parteien Systems geführt hat. Zeitgleich wurden zahlreiche 
Entwicklungsprogramme in Tansania eingeführt, welche mehr oder weniger von 
internationalen Interessen  geleitet wurden.  
Der Aufbau meiner Arbeit umfasst eine theoretische Einführung in die Begriffe der 
„Politischen Kultur“ sowie des Begriffs „Good Governance“. Weiters stelle ich eine 
Analyse der Politischen Kultur, vor dem Hintergrund der Politik des Afrikanischen 
Sozialismus dar. Ich stelle die wichtigsten externen und internen 
Entwicklungsprogramme und Initiativen, welche seit den 1990er Jahren zunehmend 
an Bedeutung gewonnen haben vor. Im letzten Teil meiner Arbeit wird das 
Spannungsverhältnis vom (Post-)Afrikanischen Sozialismus und dem Konzept von 
„Good Governance“ untersucht, welcher für den Wandel der Politischen Kultur 
ausschlaggebend ist. 
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